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L e o n  T r o t s k y  
T H E  S T R A T E G Y  OF THE 
W O R L D  R E V O L U T I O N  

C o n f e a t n  
btmhtiw 
1. !me Com* Xnsdepaaay of the h t d  Cba* 
of the Draft Program 
cterhtk Feat- of the Shtegs of tbe 
hlutionary Epocb a d  the R& of the Party 
,. , 8, The Third Congma and the Quation of the Perc 
meat Eevohth according to TPnin and awed 
ing to Bdyrin 
4. 'fhe,GemamEvente of 1- &the-of 
ra and F m h  
lhPege of Ultra-Left P&y 
' 8. The Period of RiightCentrbt D o w n - S w  
9. The l l d 8 ~ x ~ u h t  r & e r  of hd* 
of the Party Rdgh 
1I1. The R e a m  for the ]Defeat of the Oppodth d 
Zta PerspCha 
I n t r o d u c t i o n  
&It seems,w Engela wrote t o  Eduard Bernstein, 
workers'.prty of s large mutry can only develop 
j itself in intend itrug&, u L established by dialectical 
laws of development in general." What Engels wrote half 
a certturg ago in connection with the task of conatituthg a 
revolutionary party in Frmce dl hob god today 
this m e :  .that decay and colLple thresten the workem' 
party nnleaa its foundations and euperatructure are * 
peamy tested to  determine the sonndneas with which they 
the veering ddar of the dass ~ h & g h .  
me &gime imposed upm the Cov* ,  
m a t  throughout the world by a series of eymta,.a-~ 
 thoa at pmedent in history, f o m d ~  prohibit8 SI 
-&nation in the domain aeer W+ it bo% M 
for good reason, because such a test ia not oatl~~*a* 
eipd prerequisite for the ovwthww of the ' 
guarantee that thirr overthrow *auld f & ~ .  
' why it greeb ite ideological dper&qa iq & af . 
Comunim with such rabid fury, witli dm and fdmh~od, 
and even with phyaical violence and p&eu&~, . 'It reglwdn 
the mildest questioning with na~ue-w ,#* i d  the 
5 idea of a grouping within the rnovmne~~Wow&e,r twnpor- 
'ary-that defends a conception diftermk from that whish 
 ah, it denouaees as hewy rtod,treason, deapite the f h  
that ruth grouphip have d wly been common in the 
movement but b v e  f requent'Iy hem mceeaary and have con- 
Pdnct ive  ideological th~nght, vibrant the life 
that is  sale only by absorption of expeAence, hae be= 
bt i f ted  by the oflcial party w e ,  which rubstitutea for it 
a wo*es pxod~ct, th0-y 8 b a  by the hreru- 
-tic -r. Hand i. h a d  d a g r w  pmo.r 
~ ~ . f * a m ~ ~ d t 8 e ~  a 
* k & , h e r d o e a  not d h i 8  dcem$~)ta-* 
met..Mp to  f~~ the 8trlrhm a d  tu&cm.of q M b p  
l&.figIrte fors bl other t h a n k  a m ; h h h d $ k &  
M e d e n d l &  by thewordobq! l&tEaeMdU* 
my m y ,  that 6, in t h e  Cornmukt partJr, all tk %+& 
d 116- accurately, dl this m reveraad a ha 
t b  tase mement became corroded By what has 
d d  S t d i k n .  
It'ia not M) mu& s rigid a d h m c e  to a p d i G d  
tsat the hinnnt group in Communii?m demands 
m e h r ~ h i p .  Even deviations from thir courne me 
mP&s and f&ueneg. Like &e English 
Charcb, which would Urnore r e d l y  pardon a 
thirtywight of its thirty-nine articleu + w onethirt 
*ah of its income", the bureaucracy ie prepad to 
give enythhg but a flaunting of its aardid tenet: ~ 
qaeetioaing obedience that ihws R.om r recoetioxt of 
own infdibility. This. newij-diecoved requhmmt 
lmembef~hi~ of the Commmbt mrtv hea had dewmks 
aid, ps&cularlv since it is c h n d  with bewddering d 
* 
11 
dfecta up& the Commanist movement. It htta emolidatec 
a bareaucratic caarte which b divided from the ranks of the 
moveanent and the realities of the s t r e e  by an ev& 
-g gulf, and reflect8 their interests a d  dqmd~ w% - 
iminiehing accuracy. 
n e  recent hbtory of the American Commrmiet rn- I 
Pdy membmhip were swept d d e  bg a cab- 
Ezeciltive CalmitteE of the 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ d ~ ~ ~ ~ f h e ~  
@&idoftbepmkytoIendit. T k n t i s t h e ~ d  
the fom garr of op-t hdet&ip of the 
Pepper fadion in this country* In 1QiW, matten had goo- 
g m m e d f o t h e p o i a t w b e r e r r i m i l a r ~ n f r o m t h e 3 n -  
ternatid center of the ~ U C T B B ~ ,  the Stulhiat mull- 
ine, wiped out the de&a and mta of ninetenthe d tb 
m y  membership and ap- the Fwter p u p ,  repre 
* mating the muining tenth, to direct the psrty'~ dcduim. 
Naturally, rooh leader* which are mnde or unmade 
in ten &&, are not to be taken domly. dad thorn 
who appoint them do not a e  them ~ r i w l y .  They cle- 
msnd of the national leademhipa mame o- 4 
belief in infaU%ty thak in by the ktter fram 
these t h y  are appointed to W 
p e e -  a* m b l y  produm ttr own o p  
po-ta. Unable to withotand my of h pb- 
i t r e s o h  t o e x p & n o f f  d m o a d - p h - . b  
nude thrse c r i t i c h  od.*b of tka nllt of th 
party. T h e q d d o n  of thae -CWf&&'&f  
view in ro aoatid for the partfidp- o&' 
*tea the critical rihtiom b 
freer h a d  for its &ua 
. . -- 
mwement. 
It is with much a cri- h t  & 
comrade %by mupiem i t d .  If 
to  whnt evenb and words in the 
&Prove the view of the lag- in the petty *ge@h'- 
and the petty bourgeois in the Communist camp, 
I nothing in the great hintorid dispute but a 'M' % 
between Trotsky and Stdin", thie work dl tb*q @& 
f t n  pithy contrasting of the standpaint of thd %& 
Oppwikion with that of the hecial point of view [- 
Bwhnrin), d an sluembhg of the fact. a d  eve& 
a c h  h e  oppodng views can be conclwMy vc&&& 
hmthatwhathhivedhrere latcatothemoft )d'm8n-  
viii 

-aear 4. to ~ d - t h e  dm d u a a  it. at- 
&m of- the manner in whioh a COPT Wau dbb& 
& a romanw. It is s a t  h
*+ condemnation of the rgsisle thir ihthat  
a oopy had to be literally mnggled out of the Soviet Union, 
ro that the hnmunjst workem might j& its merits bv 
the docammt itself and not medy rely upon the 
baresucrat'a cynically f a I s M . 4 o n  af it. It was h d y  
publinhed in the United States under ttle title The Dmfb 
p r v m  of $he C A b m  A CfjfJCJdWl of F & I R ~ R ~ c I ~ ,  
a 8 d t h e e f F e c t i t h s d i n c o ~ e o m e o f t h e ~ t m i l i -  
b t a  in the movement of the of& O p p s i t i ~ ~ ~ ' ~  
viewdl f a y  c o d m e d  the f e a r o ~ , ~ c h . ~  $he 8talin- 
B m W  + h e  to auppmu St. 
The second nectmn, which a i n h t i d  baresumdtr 
condemned all the mare h d y  h m  they Bad nevm 
r e d  it, never even p- ta 
de1-t~. fa fact, it wan d y  80- tigte &p 
tiom of the Americm &hion %hat we we *t 
there had been a uecond section! We are &d @ 4- been 
ablt'to entrtoh €him document at of & 
We dnh to take this occaaiorr t o  p w  
tion of the pubfishers for the gene* of e 
Msrtin Abern, Max E n d ,  Morrin M da-M- 
msm It is their k d n l  contribntions that ma& -# ,p& 
bh for ae to print this booklet and a d  if aq&adb% 
h m a  a d t  a d  wide distribution. W e  &a&#,-- 
p m  oar tbh to comrade C o d  fAa& m b  - 
M her dnable aid in er- and h p ~ ~ & .  
Max Bhe- 
Nm Pa*, N d u r  m, 1880. 
1 T h e  C o m p l e t e  i n a d e q o t c y  e f  &ea 
C'entral C h a p t e r  of t h e  D r a f t  Progirw 
Inhm&od, however, oodd formulate h e  p h -  
~ p k ,  P M I ~ ~ Y  8-, 0dy a-r&cdy, and Q* 
h partially in the erperiencem of variouu countries. Ths 
@ of the h a d  htermtional, homer, led to such me 
and idern accodng  to which, in the h r i o m  exprw- 
rion of B~~ W e  movement ia evetytbhg, the end -'. In other m o d ,  the rtmtegicd krlr dieappeared . 
and WM &solved in a Mmovement" of h & e  ftroticnl M y  
p r o b b .  Only the Third Intmmtiod ~ t a b b l d  the
ri&o of the revolutionary a t r a w  of C1 ' enadom- 
m y  uubordhted the kc t ica l  n d d a  foih to & 
dmbh of the 0rat tKo mw, rPpon 
who& shoulder6 the third restun t h d @  fO . 
tionary character of the pxesat epoch 4 the &a& 
hiatorio m e n -  of the O a t o k  W o h h  *.mkatqg 
of the Third Inkmatianal immediately @ W a d  an iwdE 
uable @king qwrieme of the h i ~ k i d  
aypk The h y a m  of FxLtmaoT*% za$ifm- 
h o o J , h m m r , a t t h e u a m e t i m e ~ t o r u ~ ~  
not only of p t  b a t h  bat alro of tlm -k t  ddtsfi ' 
of tbe proletariat, I q h n h g  with lBX& To a & 
&en*, therefore, the quedhm of Jtretegy and tactioe 
ehould hme constituted the eeatrd p&t in &e progrim of 
the Camintern. In d t y ,  -, +he tlaechaptei in tbe 
draft pmgram devoted to tba and tactic8 of the 
Cammuniet -khal, l&h ttsa &title ''Tke R d  to 
the -todip of the R&tdqtIr, ia one of the -rat 
and moet &id of a h  part of this chapter 
ahat concerns the Eant redly c o m k  only of a geaeraXiga- 
tion of the h b k e n  made a d  the preparation of new o m .  
!Fhe beginning d the b p h r  engag- in a criti- of 
*o*rchb, of d u k r y  ryadiealism, of cwtraative 
mddhm and many o h .  Here we have a mim of 
fihrary imbtiona of the C m k t  diadfe~fo which in ik 
t h e  opened the m of the r h M d y  estabhhed pdiq 
of the proletariat through an i q p i o d y  t e n e  charactsr- - 
h8ha of the m t  hp0h~t V&&h of Ub* 
But to q g a  sow, in the tenth year of the h t e n u e  of . 
politid needs one 
Ebrary pedantry. Thia baht mCPDald e dy 
I the program and b i l  a place in the M d  B ,- 
a The &-ion of ih inheme over the 
itr o m  &tam . . . , as well se over the b d '  
form, codd be herted without 
of the Seoamd hkrmtiond. 
maat imgrtant p r o b  of 
iltrt with the atrategg 
--on * Gmlml 
, 3 . H O  # T L A T S e T  O t  T E a  
'r)aw d & of thc World acPolutkn. b 
d&Ber -A: Tim -t staggler of the pxolctariak rth 
d a d i  here only objective ~~~, ss an ermm- 
mion of the *' m a l  cri& of capitdht9 a& mt sr' a t k b  
@ad attempta of the prolebriat at the a h r e  of power. 
H ia suUi&t to  refer to the fact that the rejsetion- 
m s a r y  in it&- of revolutionary 
(Cplt~~chi~m") is dealt with in the program without an 
n h p t  king made to answer the que&ion whether, for 
~ p k ,  the uprising in Esthonia, or the exphion of the 
%oh cetbedral in 1924, or the h k  upriming in Canton we* 
heroic exprerrsiom of revolutionary adventurism or, oa the 
contrary, planned actions of the mlukhmry &mw mf 
the proletariat. A program which does not mmw thb 
burning quation in its paragraph on H p a ~ "  is ortlf 
a diplomrtic f i e  job and no decumemk of Cemmumht 
atratqgy. 
T ~ ~ I I  ahtract, ~ u p r a - b r i d  h t m &  of kiyrquea- 
tiom of the revolutionary dm& of the p-lrirt ir u# 
coume no accident for tb program. 
Besides Bucharin'n manner of haw que&km ia r 
mal-literary, pedantic, argumentative tmd not kb bn 
&he-revoIutionary way, the reaoon for itxi* a h  the fact 
that the authors of the program, for too wily comprt. 
hemale masom, do not at dl prefer to ded more fully 
dth the 8t=t*cd leM0m 8f &C k t  dearde. 
But e program of revol~thmy &d mtu~ally ohodd 
not be a bare collection of abstruut a~mrtiom which h?am 
no relstion to  all tbat has tnkm place in these himtorid 
yearm. A progrlun cannot of cotlrre b r i b e  the evenb of 
the p t ,  btlf it must proceed fmm them meats, bme itself 
upon them, embrace tham, d relste to them. A program, 
by the porition it taker, m u t  make it p e i b b  t o  under- 
rtand d the impoptant fecta of the draggle of the prole 
tarirrt and the controvemy in the Cornintern. If this is tnze 
with regard to the program aa a whole, then it ir dl the 
more ro with regard to that part of it which is npecady 
M c a t e d  to  the quwtiorur of mtrategy d tactica. Here, 
h & ~ o r d r ~ f  wbrthrube-fharr 
mad *Ira be mkr%d what has 
2. T h e  C h a r a c t e r i n t i c  F e a t u r e s  of 
- Btrategy of t h e  R e v o l u t i o n a r y  Ep 
L .  An'd t h e  R 8 l e  of t h e  P a r t y  
C 
of tbe suthorn that st the time of Marr 
~ a d j ~ ~ v e e t o ~ f ~ r k ~ t t a e s r m s d ~  
-t WM the age of khe d g h ,  the d a d o p a t  d #ha 
-tion of the h o d  International, whose p e  
ktoriMA c w 1 1 p l & l y ~ ~ v i t h t h e ~ O f  
the imperialist war. 
PoEtica considered aa a hiutarical fador, hua dmp 
mam;Sed behind economics. Thw, while the dombion ad 
h n c e  capital and hut monopoly, for & d y  
bgan t o w a d  the end of the ninehenth -9, 6 nwr 
epch of international politicu which reilscts tl& Pnot, &Irt 
! begins with the imperkht war, with the October d e n  
' d with the founding of the Third T n b r n d i d  T%e - explmive chsracter of thir n e ~  &, d t h  itr Am@ 
&anpa of the p d t i d  flow and id& ui& itr u u s k m t  
spa9modic clam stmgg£e l x twcm F a a c h  4 &mmunh, 
b based upon the fact that the Q*- 
ryntem has dread J #pent itself a d  a a w&& h m 
eapsble of r e a s d i n g .  Thb does m o b m s m , t o  imply thnt 
individual brenches of industry d WHdd amtrh 
willnotrieeaadgmwamymors TheywQpdmptbfbtz 
~t an aaprecedented tempo. M- &ia dedopmd 
proceeds aad will have to nb %a expem8 of f i e  
development of other b m b  M 4dh&q a d  crthar 
conhtriee. And b Rump, aeuwbmd to world 
domination, with ita rap&& almwd d n b m q t d  growth hi 
the prewar Mod,  now enemukm mmre nbrply than &a 
other conhentn the w w  r d a t h  of forma, the nerr W o n  
of the world m a w  d thc d d h t i o n a  datpensd by 
war, it b preoiselg ahere t b f  & tramition from fbs 
organic epoch to the mvomati-ry epoch was p r t i d d y  
prtcipitouB. 
Theo&dy, of mume, ewn a new ehaphr of r 
p ~ Z c l & p i ~ t g w l r r t h i n t h e ~ y ~ r u l i D g  
and leading e m t r i e r  i a  zmt ~otduded. But for thiu mgft 
atism wodd first have fo mrcome enormow ~~ of r 
c b s  an well au of an i n k r n s k I  chsra&r. It mdd h 
to strrmgle the prdetariam rewlutiop for a long time, 3 
aoaldhdyhav=ebsubjagateCMm,ftrmoldhr~bo 
orsrtbiarr tbe $&st .ad la forth. An w, 

&amp k fhe political situation in the oourw of m to 
thee yeam are not brought about through any ia 
&e bauic economic factorb but bear a p d y  e u p p  
rtmcturd character and thereby mark the extreme bb 
bility of the myatem, whoee foundation is torn by i- 
cilable antagonbmbl. 
It k prwbely from thie source that the dpi0csnee of 
rwolationary stratem as ags* tactics rim to the full& 
meanare. This is abo the uource of the new wm of 
the party and the p8rky leadership. 
The draft Iimite itaelf to  purely formal dehitiom of 
the party (vanguard, theory of M a A m ,  embodiment of 
experiences, and so forth) which perhspe would not g o a n d  
so bad in a program of the fRft aocial democracy, Now it 
ia compIetely bufHcient. 
In e period of growing capitdbrn eym +he b d  party 
leademhip could at mmt a t h t e  the grnwth of a workem' 
party. Inversely, mistaka of h leadernhip c o d  d y  
retard this protege. The o b j d v e  prereqdim of a 
proletarian revolution matured b d  a l o w l ,  amd the* mrk of 
&e party had only a preparatorg 6haraeter. 
Now, on the contrary, eveq new &aq km of the 
political situation to the Left puts &a &hiem in #he handm 
of the revolutionary party. lf it k the dtid situ- 
ation, the latter veere around to h m i t e ,  Under thw 
condition# the r81e of the party hded@ & a dt& 
she importance. The words of I d u  that kwo to threa 
dap can decide the fate of khe Wematid revolution 
would have been ahmat b p d e m i b  in the epoch of the 
h n d  International. In our qmh, on tbe contrary, t h e  
mda have ody  too often h n  confirmed, md with tha 
eroaption of the Oetokr, a l w i q a  from the nepcive s h k  
W y  out of these g e d  dk h s  that e r c q h d  
paition become undermndrpble wbidi the C o m m d  
lnhmat iod  and ib l e d d i p  adapt with r~ulp%ot b the 
' 
whole msehanice of the p-t hiabricrtl parid 
One mufit be on the f a d  that the initial and 
.bario - of the aocal)sd %bbibtiOm" i# formed bg * 
 on thrt * b b w n  the g e m d  &wga& 
t ,'. 
- I 
nelr stam the prerqubites of new internatioml- : 2 
CQ~+OTLIS, that is, of new revolutiamrg s i t n a b ,  tk: .i 
utilization of which depends entirdy u p  the p d - w -  .-, 
p*rtf* fm T h e & e o f t h e a u b j w t i v e f a c t o r h s u c b r r ~ d .  
rEow organic develop& a m  remain rr fully ou~o- :T 
me, Then such Iukewam proverbs a r b  as: '% gws $ 
++wly ggts there a n p a p  and UYou crnaot butt Lhnd through a ndy', m fmth, rhich, i o  (o rS 
+mim aET the tactical d o m  of an or@ ep& *% 
t o h h  no 'Gjumphg over d atap". But: es the 
&jetwe premqubib have grown to  matndty t4e key C 
+he whole btorieal process is W e d  to  the mbj&& 
f d x ,  thet is, the party and its revolutioaarg le- 
&in p r o d a  dearly tram the &camions on the M **d 
d German October, on the hgbRnaaiaa Cmmae - . d l  **
-. rd the Chinene d u t i o ~ ~  In 811 thme c u s ,  M well u ,j 
-, a 0 t h ~ ~  of s e r  i m p ~ f i t l ~ e ,  the ~ p p ~ f i a n i ~ t i ~  t- -i 
e q m a d  i t ~ &  in the fad that it d i e d  U ~ ~ J J  apm U* $ 
and completdy peg1echd the quwtion ot r ~ I u - ,  y 
: @nary kahrdip.  Bueh an attitude, rrhjch L f a  98: 
i -I, opratea nitb pasirtiny a a a t j q  eftat ia 
' <  c p ~ C h .  * -  i 
The Oetobm revolution was a d t  of the 
' 
*mot ~ f o ~ i n . I t u m k r t n d b t b e ~ ~  
@I ~.~ tsmdopd from ~ - ' & % h &  . 
!' . 4 - b  
impidbt war. Thb general deJsfation to ths 
A B C of Msrrism. Notwithtanding that, to y e  s d  a
qwtion i n :  Would we ham #€?id power in Octok  hrd 
not Lenin arrived in Rmsia at the right moment? h m 
absoIutely no contradiction to Marrism. Them 5 much to 
hdhte that in ~nch 8 caae we would perhap not hew 
seized power. The reaistaace of the party W -m 
mention here that for the most part they were the ranla 
people who a t i l l  stand at the head today-wtu very strong 
even under Lenin. h i d  mithout Icenin it would d o ~ y  
have been much rtrooger. The party cuuld wry d y  ham 
fW to adopt the necmsry coume at the right time, d 
the more ro since the time was extremely ahort then. At such 
moment only a few daya am often &iva The working 
mameu did indeed pmr upwad from below with p t  
valor, bat witbout a convinced direction, leading con- 
ociody to the Ifoat, victory would have been improbnbla h 
the meaptbe, however, a t h a  boar@& would have n m  
dered Petrograd to the &mmm and after a uuppmsion of 
the proletarian up-, probably reeonnozidated its poww 
intheformofBonaprtkm,throog;haqnratepcedth 
Germmy and other mauum, Th emtire m e  of m t r  
would have been Merit for r whok of yearn, 
**fn the Geman rewlutioll of 1918, in ttbe HrmgaAn 
zwolutiom sf 1919, m the &ptank Wr). of the Italian 
proletariat in 1020, in the G e m a m  m t n  of 1998, in the 
English genertrl stnie of 1926, in the Vienna up* of 
- X#7 8nd the h e  rWV- of 1-87- 
where, one and the nmae politid c m W & n  of the past 
decade, eveu if dZemnt in form and degree, waa manif& 
In an objectively ripe revolutiouaq situation, ripe not 
only with regard to the sod prereqaiaites bat swt 
infrequmtly also with regard ta the m o d  for struggle of 
the mane-, the rubjective factor, thaf is, a revolutionary 
maaa party, w w  hcking or else thie party lacked far- 
righted and courageous M e d p .  
Of conme, the +wee of the Cornmu& partiea and 
their ledemhip did mot pcl.ohanot fdl  from ths slry; 
rre rather a mplt of the whole psst of Europe. For all thrt, 
' t .  
'.,.*. 
k. w 
~ ~ ~ i . t p d t 9 J o o l i I d ~ n t * t r z ~ ~  
t in the p- eristing maturity of the objedtivey tionmy contradidom if, of course, there e d u t d  i 4 ~ p o n ~ p a r t o t t h e ~ * . R h i c 8 ~ ~  this P-M of development hated of m e  it. Et & 
contradictions in themselves oomtitute the mahi an--d 
B 
the forrrard moyement, then the d- of' 
contradictionn between a generally ma- 
uituation (deapite ebb and flow) and the bw aS. 
C 
p d y  of the proletariat now ought to -* @& 
impetna of the fornard moment for the Comimterat,. d 
k d  for its European rection. 
Without an d v e ,  generrrl, d i a l d i d  
don of the prwent epoch aa an epoch of h p t  t w  r
resl education of the young partiee, a c o d  a t m w  
leadership of clam atrasgles, e correct appImth 6 
taetica and a rberp and bold right about face at a turn of 
tb sibtion, is imposeible. And it ie juat at 4ud1 8 bm 
that two to  three daye often decide the d&y of fbe 
international revolution for yeam to come. 
The chapter of tbe &sift program devoted to *w 
and tactic8 speaks of a struggle of the party for the prole- 
tariat in general, it ape& of a general &&, of tbs 
armed uprising in generaL Bot it does not wen d m  
the peaaliar character snd the inner rhythm of €he p- 
epoch. Witbout comprehending these theoretically a d  
Ydhg" them politically, a red d u t i o u n r y  hdemhip 
b h p 0 8 ' b l a  
That is why thh chapter turned out so pdantidy, 
re thinly, so imdeqtlately from beginning to end 
8. T h e  T h i r d  Congrenr  a n d  t h e  Q u e r t i o a  
Of t h e  P e r m a n e n t  B e v o l a t i o n  . 
A c c o r d i n g  t o  L e n i n  a n d  
A c c o r d i n g  to B a d h a r i n  
Three perid can be atabliahed in kbe p H i d  dm+ 
opment of Europe the war, TB% W perird-mmw 
13 T H B  B T I A V D B Y  O F  T X &  
fTDm 1917 to  lml, the reeond from March 1-1 to -k@ 
1988, and the third, M y ,  from October 1998 up h & 
English general str ike or even up to the present. 
The revolutionary movement immediately ' 
the war was strong enough to overthrow the born@ 
Still there was no one t o  carry this out. The social d a m e  
raay which held the leadership of the traditional or- 
htiom of the working clasu, exerted all ita dortr to nave 
the ri5gime of the bourgeoisie. pp%,n we looked fornard d 
that t ime .to an immediate a h  of porn by the p~r,ld- 
tarirt, we ca~cu1atgd that a rwoIutiorurry party wodd be 
forged rapidly in the fire of tbe civil aer. But tllc kwa 
momenta did not coiaci8e. The revolutionrry wave of &a 
post-war period ebbed Wore the CwDmanist pa* 
up and reached maturitr in khe struggle with the social 
demacracy 80 aa to takt aver k k  l-Bip of the uprising. 
In Mardh 1921, the @muan Communist I'P rtp under- 
took the attempt ta avail it& 0% the d d h h g  wave in 
order to overthrow the bcmrgda &b whh one blow. The 
guiding thought of. the Qwmm h b l  Committee irn W a  , 
war to  save the Soviet Rep&& (tIse &my of n o c i a b  . 
in one country had not yet been pro&&& at the time). 
But it turned out that the de*k$un of tlte leader&ip 
and the dissatisfaction of the rn-~am met get mmgh for 
victory. There is required in additisn a ~ t r i e a  sX other 
prerequisites, primarily a close commkim ef she Iededip 
wi& the maem and the confkleme of'& mama ia &he 
leademhip. The prerequisites did ngt yet & st h t  
time. 
T h e  Thkd C o n p e s  of the ComMwn m a  the d g s p t  
thnt stood between the firat and second perid.  It -tab- 
lished the fact that the resources of the Commanist parkhit, 
poKticalIy as well as organbatinally, are not rdcient for 
the conqueet of power. It r a i d  the rrlogan %to the 
maarei?', that is, the cbnquest of power by means of a 
~ m 8 -  Of bhg by @hg thm 
daily queetiona and daily ~tmgglen. For the m a r  h 
;a;S deilg We in a rewlotiuxmrg e p d  &o, even if in 
M t  M'erent way. 
E w a a L n  .mvosvTIox;: +: . i fE i2  . -t Y 
.a 
I d  T%ia decisrstion met wig vehmatt &e 
I I C o n p a s  which was M e d  theoFeCidy by Bucb& At 
'1 that tkne be held tbe viewpoiat of bin owa and m&%h 
! X t d a t  permanent revdutiom "'Bucawr arpih&*h 
- d m w d  itself, b1SsPuf~c the vietory mmt be 1- 
neither of retreats nor temporary 
d M y  &o bring about our des- 
very eymticaIly tbe path of mtrnggle for the 
5 L.* in order, in that way, to reach the st-h for 
,= poker. W e  need your Piatary, but not your r e d b m  b 
r? wt Mdar unfavorable conditiorra. We will mamge to 
p-  main^ onme~vm in th. soviet republic witb the h e  of 
L?. . 
the N.&P. and even to go forward. You will ati l l  be able 
b-ehomaidetthe~httirnewbenyo11hawg~~ 
~ Q U Z  forcer md u t h d  the favorable situation." 
81 4 - 
t i  
Although these events took place a f h  the Tenth pbrty 
1.- : 
Chngrms, which rrr is known forbade fautiom, hth neve~- 
e r r  took the initiative at that time h become the bead 
_ .  of a mew faction for the at@ again& the then 
h n g  &a-Leftih. In our intimate cod-, L d a  
t 
p d  the qnemtim for decision as to how the furthsr e t m g g h  
i 
' 
rPorjd have k be &ad on in caae the Third World 
-a s h o d  c o r n  with Baeba*~ viewpint. Oru 
a f& " of -t t h e  did not ~IZV&P f t i d h  only 
ib opponents a b d y  up& during tb;e Congm~. 
Bcrcharin of aaarse depiahd to the ZRft of M a d a m  
men f d h r  the others. M y  at the Third COP 
and later, too, he foaght a p k t  my view that the 
conjunotare in Europe d indubitably risq 
while in spite of a d o l e  series of defeatn of the proletariat 
a d  in qi te  of am udutahble rise of the c o n j ~ ~ ,  be 
no d& but a new rim of revolutionary struggle. 
Budmrin, who btld khia mtandpi& of r mlmbtia  pmm- 
cnoe of the d c  crisis as w d l .  the revolution in 
gmeral foaght ~pbt my -on i thb qwtion for 
l o n g t i m e u n t i l f a a t a f t r a Q y o o m ~ h k t o ~ f h n t h t  
had been mistaken, at dl -ftm a veq 
M- 1 
At kh th 8d . n d d * ~ 8 -  BllChah 
I qahtd & policy of the anitsd front md the tramitional 
demsndr, pmcdbg from hh m e c b d d  conception of the 
p3-f of the ~ ~ ~ 1 1 1 ~  procem* 
!me a h g g l e  bctrrsar * tno tende$ciw, tba 
sgn&mk$ M a d a t  mnceptiw of the pcfmanent h r a u b r  
e d b h t ~ ~ ~ w d ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ y a d  
f i f u r l n q r h i c h w u b y n o m e u u m o r n o L i n l o f m ~  , 
~ b i m  of BU&+Y* mn be follarred wWh cPrrE# 
of Dthrptteatiom-big- w d a a  lmrlL 8tihitbmpw ,i 
&ow, for after all %he p M  attitFtde of B&* h - 
a m t i d y  quite the ..me ultra-left eohohtichh of + ?i 
-t revolutionm, era+ tbst it b lxm W 3 
around to its other ~ida While, far exam* 
wsr of the opinion ant9 1928 that mithwt a 
w w  crisis a d  without a permsaent 
Europe the Soviet republic would have to go 
now &covered a recipe for the blr;ldiw up 
without any international mdution at all. To 
the tiptilted Bubrhist  permanenq haa not 
my bysthe f& thst the present leadcm of the 
far too frquently combine their advent& of 
with .their opportunist position of today, and 
way around. -'' 
The Third Congress wae s p a t  aignpoek Ib u  :- 
L 
*re st i l l  vital and fruitfd today. The FFourth , 
only made these leesone con& 
The dogan of the Third C o n p a s  doeu not dm& . I 
read: "Iabo tka nwaw", bat: %to power through r g 
previoun conqnemt of the mnraes ! " Brter the faction led bg 
Lenin (Lenin characterized it demonatdhely ma 
'CRightn wing) c o m W y  had t o  pull back the majodty 1 
during the whole Congrem, he arranged e private comfemmm ; 
toward the end of the C o q r e s ~  in which he w a d  prophe& . 
id ly :  'CDo not forget that in thh g a d o n  it r h d  . 
only be r matter of a god o d d d  atart for the 
t i o v  jamp. In the straggle for the u r & o r  tb 
st+ for power." I 
The eventa of 1028 demomtrated that the p i b  . 
taken by h n i n  waa not only not grmped by %me thaf 
*re ledn but aloo by mimy leadern. i -. 's 
.. 3  
- 4 r r r  d 
4- q h e  G e r m a n  E v e n t e  of 1 9 9 8  a n d  t h a  
L e n r o n r  o f  O c t o b e r  
The turning point tbt opens a new, pt-hddat 
period in the devdopment of the Comhtem is oonatitated 
by the &man evenb of IW8. The occupation of the Rub . 
by Pmch troops in 19- 8 i g d M  rr A p e  into war ~ O B  
in Europe. slthougth the eeeond appearance of this &eaue 
was ineomparabiy weaker than the k t ,  violent revolu- 
tionary eomequew had nevertheh to be v t e a ,  since 
it had the already f d y  debilitated organism d. 
Germany. 
T h e  leadership oi the Cornintern did not consider thie 
at the right time. And the C9ePmsn Cmmmunist Party 
contipaed to abide by t h e  onesiddy derrtood slogan of 
the Third Congress which wan to have turned them 08 the 
k t e n i n g  road of putechim. W e  have already ment4oned 
ubove that in our dage of abrupt hma it is moat a d t  
for a revolutionary leadership t o  feel the p& of political 
events at khe proper moment, so aa to atch every h r p  
awewe and to  turn the helm at tbe right time. 8 ~ d 1  
q u d t i e s  of a xevolutionsry Idemhip are mt acquired 
.imply by swearing by every new cirmbr of the Combtern. 
They can be acquired only by the d h w e  of the mxamry 
theoretical prerequi~iten khrough hiepadent experiences 
4 red adf-criticism. . 
The abrupt turn .from the ta&.e d the March &p 
of 1991 to a eystematic revoluticmaq work in the preer, 
in meetings, trade miom and pnrhmmt was not m y ,  of 
' 
eouree. After the crisis of this tarn had b n  w e a f i d  
there arose the danger d the devdopment of a directly 
oppwite onesidednesa. The daily struggle for the mamw 
sw~m all attention. It areah ite own tactical routine 
and dive* the eye from the ~trateg id  tasks hing out 
of a change in the objective rituatioa 
Lo the summer of 1988, the i n t d  position of &w 
many, specialty in connection with the cohpse of the t d i c  
of pm&m resistance, waa pitively catastrophic. It 
that the podtion of the hurgeoiie war ' 
did pot h a w  the n v  revolutionary 
it was preciuely khe Commaniet party, in wham 
the key, that opened the door for the bourpbie a! 
Why didn't the Gemsn resolution lud to a dabQP 
The reasons lie completely in the tacticn, not in ths p 
conditions. Here we have a classic example of a 
revolutionary eituation. After dl the German pmMdit 
had gone through in recent years, it could be Id b s  
M u i v e  struggle only if it were convinced that thh tiPw 
the quwtion would really be brought to a decision a d  &$k 
the Communist party was ready t o  fight and c a w  
achieving the victory. But the Communiet party w 4 : f o  
work only very irreso~utely a d  belatedly. Not only t8s 
Bightr, bat alrro the M e ,  despite the fact h t  they #ow 
each other very sharply, looked prettg fatalistically apn 
the process of revolutionary development More Septemhei. 
October 1923. 
To investigate npw, after the event, how far the 
oonqueut of power would have been "sssured" w i t h  a ~ormgt 
which is certaioly contradictory to  an the other j 
of thia organ: 
If in May 1924, during the rtabiliestioa of 
TPS I T S A T S U X  O f  2H 
rn among the bour- iW and an u n p d h d  
m d  of draggle of the proletsrian maam in the induat*ial 
the Coprmpmbt party had the majority of 1 the 
population on it# nide, could and ehould have fo+b amd 
had all the c h a m  for r ~ o w . "  (PMVDA, llBa y %6,lW%.) 
A d  here are the worda of a German delegate at the 
F!ifth World Collgxesr whom I do not b: 
&There is not a single worker in Gemmy who did 
mt h o w  that the party should have gone into tbe straggle 
and d not have ~hanned it. The l ~ x n  of the C.P.G. 
for* the indepdept rBle of the C.P.B. That wss one 
of the m& rensona for tbe Octpber Meat." (Pw-4 
June 94,1924.) 
A g r e a t d e a l ~ d r e a d y b b e n s a i d a n d d i a c u ~ ~  
if aot always t o  the point, on w b t  took place in the 
hdembip of the Geman party and the haintern in 1998, 
q e d l y  during  it^^ rec:ond half. K a h  in p e r t h k  
ham brought much codmion into thb questio~.; tbe name 
Kuuhem who, ta& in 1924-1926 comi8ted in proving that 
ralvation Lay only in the ledemhip of Zinoviev, and who, 
from this or that date in 1926 began to prove that the 
lendeddp of Zhviev  was &noun. The snthority raquirad 
for such a responsible j-t of the nitu8tIon b 
probably eonfelmd upon Kuusipem by the fact that be 
h b d  in 1918 did everythihg that by in hie weak powem 
to doom tbe revolution of the Finnish proletariat to 
h h c t i o a  
The d a w r  sfter the event to mnh k me a ME& 
arity with the line of Brandler has already been u n d d e n  
more than oxme. It in true the attempt t o  do this in the 
U.S.B& m a  made only m n mseked form, for here mtmy 
tnerr how mattere d y  stood, but quite o p d y  in 6 
meny, on the contrary, for no one knew there. 
Q t h  a c c i d d y ,  I 8nd in my possession a fragment, which 
appeared ia print, of the ideological struggle tbat w m  
csrried on at that time in our Centxal Committee over the 
-tion of the &mmn rm2ution. a In the materid for the 
January co&er€mcs, I sm directly accused by khe P O E M  
B-u of a hod& distraat the Germsa Central 
~ i n t h e p s l i o d ~ i b - ~ B r r f l  
thersiitdly: "...ConrradeTrotSk3, b e f o ~ ~  - 
t l a a ~ o f t h e ~ a I ~ [ ~ P h $ m  
of 19331, made a B@ which p t l y  e d d  dl* ' 
k t &  W t t e e  membem. He decked in th3s m p d  
that the leademhip of the (4erman Commmht P&F .& . 
w o r t h k e  a d  the C d r a l  Committee of the -4 
i .  dqdlP rith f*t.llsn and ~~ a. Comrade Trow declared farther that & . 
c o d i t i m  the Geman revolution ia oolmdemned te Mbh ' , 
T i & n p e e c h p r o d u d . a n a e t o ~ d b g i m ~ S t i i t ~  - 
majority of the oomrada v of the o p b h  %t W 
' 
.@Epic wne caIZed forth by an incident [?I that M 
at the Plenum of. the Central Commitaae which had + 
to da with the Germsn mmlutiun and that this da- 
mae .C c m t d h  to  t8s objmtirra #tat4 of &dm." 
(Bda- om ma co-o9 oa TH~C L.O.P* J w  
19544, p+ 14 My emphimi. L.T.) 
Xt maka no Mereace how the Central Conmi- 
mmbera w m t e d t o q h i u m y  w e - m t  the &st- 
m m - i t  WM dictated onlyhy concern over the fato 
of the Geman M u t i o n ,  UnforhmMy, my fear ~ r m  
~ 0 m p M y  r e d i d .  IP part dm becswe the majority of 
the Central Committee of the b b g  party, aewldhg Q 
%a o m  admimion, did not grwp at the right time that 
my warning cormponded very Wen to the "objectha rt*b 
of afllairs ". Of couree my propal did not lmk bardm 
q h c h g  the Central Committee of Brsndlw by any other, 
for on the eve of d d i v e  eventr that would bw been parert 
I adventurism. Since the summer of 1023 I demmdd th& 
f r t i d y  and xeaolute position be *en on the quation d 
., the armed upding a d  a cormpondhg mobilhtiw of 
ferns for the aupport of tbe German Centrd - 4 
hter attempta to aaorii t o  me a solid.rit= 3 
f lins of the Central humittee of Brmdk, whom m h k m  t+! 2 
rnre redly only a W o n  of tbe &km of the b 
iatern leaderehip, were priucipdy evoked by the f*et ttt*b 
dtrn t8s eapi#&th of the Gennan party I h o d  mt 
T @mat =king Brancaer alom the rcnpegoat, *I- mr 
k .<. I develop the bought t+t in tht present epoch, r re& 
In 
. tionary situation which one has negbckd to n t h  even for 
a few days, wi l l  return only yeam later. thou@ --it .. ia hard to believe it - waa a t a p e d  us B l m q h m  a d  
individualism ". 
1 The innumerable artidea h t e d  ytainrt the Lwrm of Oc#sbm only prove how thoronj&lg the of 
the October overthow have M y  been forgotten, a d  
how little itu lasons have pw&mded ttae comdowasm. To 
rant to rhift mpomrribility for d t u k a  of tha Ic*dcn mn 
the mas- or to disparage the impohma af ia 
is a typical Menah&& &am. It a r k  & of 
the total incapacity to underatad d i a l d d y  the % u p  
&mCture'', namely the eupe&raetare over #a c b a  
formed by t h e  party, nud tke 8 r m p a t m c h m  over tha 
party, that ie, its centre1 leadernhip. Them are per* in - 
which even Marx and En& would be m b l e  to driva 
developments forward a nhgle bh. But there are &o 
per id  in which people of much and- dik, danding 
at the helm, can check the devdqment of the international 
mlt l t ion  for a whole rerits of para. 
The athwptn undehken r e a d y  to prmat tHs 
matter as though I h d  r e n o d  my I;BIamu of Ocbok  
are entirely absurd. To be @are, I have dmitted making s 
%pihken of secondary i m p o h m .  It appeared h amt, 
4 y, when 1 m t e  my Lsr~ofll of O c t o b ,  tbat in, in the 
1 wmmer of 19% that Stalin Bad adapted n position ftdm to fbe Left-that i6, L e f t 4 e u t ~ t - - ~ 5 n a v i e ~  in the 
*ring of 1MW. I m u  not d p  initiated in the inner lifa 
of the group tEant oocupkd the af the ceater, of &a 
The ideas argumi by me in the Lmrm of M W  . 
&ah h i r  fall stremgth even now. Yea, even rn- ' 
conhmatioa over and over again after 19% -- 
Among the numerotlll Mculties in r proletarb m :i 
loti011 is r particul~~r~ dehike, apedo di&ul~.' 3 . 
oat d the pmition and taka of revolutionary p4&p ' " 
bde~hip Even the most revolutionary partiee 
&k of confronting the events, slo$aas a d  mean- d 
h g g l e  of yesterday that are being sharply pcipic*te& 
dtll khe new t d 8  and reqniremmh. A d  there came& 
6 alt, be a sharper turn of events than fiat n q n i d  
by the armed uprising. It ie right here that the danger a h  
*tssttheplicyoftbeptrrtyleadershipandtbe*f - 
i lB,pmal does not correspond to the action of the e b u  
4 the r e q u k m h  of the situatioa Dllring a r$aw A 
trsquil murue of polit3cal Me, such a eontradieEion aam 
be o t r ~ ~  out, even though with lwm, yet without4r 
c a M +  But at a, period of violent crisis, it is p a  
t4m that is lecIthg t o  eliminate thh contradiction d b 
o p p i t e h r a c t e r ,  Tbt&thec&ntwhenthehdddp 
wtdittawm the development of the mhtion md & a t a h  
the Utb month of prepmcy for the rtinth A c r a ~  m p k  
of much a contradiction ere the wmtm in -my in March 
1921. There we had in the party a crass appear- of 
the Wantile &ease of radicdhft tbe c4nueq- of 
which were patsebism (revolutionary adventurism). 
danpr wad a h  -3 for the future. That ia why ths 
t leerom of the Third of the Cornintern rebin their 
for- Only the a r m a n  e x p i a c e  of 1988 brought befora 
w the opposite danger in hard d t y .  The Bitartion rrar 
ripe hnd the leademhip lagged behind. By the t h e  thim 
mtradiction WM atraignhned oat, tbe dtwtiom had 
already changed, the rmrswa d e d  a d  the relatiomhip 
of form beaume fdammhBy worse. 
The German Me& of 192% n a t d y  had  man^. 
natiod pecalirritim. But it dready contained many t p  
i d  festarm dm, whioh a i g d i d  a general danger. T'hh 
~ r c a n b e ~ ~ ~ t ~ e r i r i t o f t R 9 r m o b  
h T #  M fh Blw of th# t d t i 0 n  #O MpMd 
The *the of a proletarian parky are already 
by their very =tun far h a  mcephi to burg& public 
opinion, Cert&n e h e n t a  of the pxty ledemhip &d tha 
d d l e  byera of the party will almp ttnfaihgly auccamb 
in larger or amalIer meaem to the rmrterid d ideologhl 
termr of the bourgeotie. Such a dmgw &odd not d q d y  
be rejected. T o  be sure, there is ncr d y  +t it 
muitable for all cam. Neverthehe, the h t  etep h a d m  
@thg it-ia to grrq itm nature and ib sour- Ths 
unfdhg appearance or development of Right grou- 
in dl the Commdat P d e o  in the *p&ber'? period 
b on the one hand a wult of the greabt objective difltE 
c u l h  and dangers of this Hjump", but on the other hand 
the d t  of a furioua amault of bourgeot public o p i m h  
T'here d o  lies the whole import of the Right groapinga 
And that is jut why ~ 1 u t i o n  a d  vadbtiona a h  
uufnilingly in the Commrmiat parties at the mom& when 
they a m  moat i h p o w .  With w, only s minority within 
the party leademhip waa n d d  by d -tiom in 1917, I 
which were, harre~er, overcome, t W a  
of fienin. h Germany, on the contrary, 
whole vacjllatd and thst wne ea 
and through it to the clean. The revo1u 
was thereby pau~ed up. In China where 
poor ]pewanto were fighting for t 
C ~ A M  kdurahip w m M  u@&t t 
were not of eouree the laart crises of 
hhtorical moment. To limit these 
minimum is one of the most importsnt tmka 
Communist partierr and the Comintern. Thia  can be 
only when the experiences of October 1917 and the 
content of the Right Opposition inside our party 
time ore peeped and eontmskd with the experiemea 
&man party in 1928. Therein Eea the purport of 
h a o a r  of Octobw. 
- 
6. T h e  B a s i c  S t r a t e g i c a l  M i s t a k e  of t h e  
F i f t h  Conmgress - . ,  
W e  hve,  beginning with  the end of 1923, a wh& 
seriea of written documents of tbe Cornintern well ru ord 
attwmces of its leaders on the 4%take in tempo" in the 
spring of 1888, dl of which are provided with the ~~ 
refereaces to Mtrrr, who ale0 miscalculated in his 
But whether the L'mintake in tempo" of the Coddem 
oowisted in an underestimation of the nearraere of tJae 
d e a l  moment of the seizure of power, h s ~  h e m  q&a 
deliberately con& ?n accordan- witb the &ghe  of 
double bookkeeping that has become trditional for the 
Iderahip in recent years, the po~ibiIity for botb 
oomtructiom bBB been left opert 
# Btlt it in not &cult to draw the aonclmion from the 
i f  whole policy J the Comintem in tho= day0 that ib h& 
t #  d p  during 'I#4 and the meter part of 19215 w t ~  d tpa 
C F  opinion that the high point of the German d i n  W# a 
, before ue. The refsrence to Mlrrr wa therefore h@f Pa % pLoe. For while Man, b a s e  of hi. fa- 
f-y raw &mol&opck#%rthsslit -,it c d d  
~ a c & r t o h i m n o t t s r e e o p h t Z B b d ~ ~ f * ~ t ~  
fwe when it M M y  More bim and t h  later ola, 
&er the revohtiom bad W y  t d  its back, stubbo~& 
to mistake thie backside for the f& of the mlutiom 
At the Thirknth Coderenee of the R w h  C o m m d t  
Party, Zinoviev, after having coined bie ambiguous formal. 
o n t h e ~ t a k e i a   tempo",^: 
"T3e Executive Commit& of &e Cornintern mwt smy 
to you that at a repetition of the same evenh in one and 
the same situation, we wodd b v e  to act the same way? 
(PMVDA, ~ a n a ~ r g  al, 1~4.) 
Thie promhe rounded like &re& On February 9% 
I@?&, Z h v i e v  spoke st rr confemme of the International 
Rd Aid on the present situation in Eurq  : 
We need apect no period now, no matter how brief, 
sf wen an external paciiiaatinn, my k i d  of e x h c b n  . . . 
Europe is entering into the stage of decisive events . . . 
Germany is appamn~y approaching a aha+ civil 
w . , . '' (PBAVDA, February 8,lm.) - 
At the h m n g  of Febfaary 1024, the Presidium d 
the E.C.C.I. e a p  in ita declaration on th Iwona of the 
I;terman wwb : 
" The Comwht Party of &mumy mu& not q a e g t  
the q d m  of the uprising d the aaisare of power from 
the order of fie day. Tbis qwstiQn anret 8- before w 
in all ita reality and urgency ., . . (PBAVI)~ F- 
7,1=) 
On March 20,1924, the E.C.C.I. w k e  to the &nmm 
party: 
" The mistake in t h e  evaluation of the of 
[what %ind of a dnt8%e? LT.] in W b w  1993, b-+t 
the party many M d t i e e .  Yet in up& of that it m a  
Orptgr am #pirode. The fundamental estimate dthe 
rame." ( P u n 4  April 20,1824. lldg em+&. L.T.) 
From 4 the E.C.CL dram tbe folloffisg 
d u e i o n :  
" The German F y  mud continue ar before with all 
iQ pwer to arm the working claw. .." (hm 
April 19, I-.) 
2*he great hhtorical drtma ' 
: dhut a etruggle of the wonderful 
-in oharaetehd here as d y  
ia a t i l l  living 'Way from the h v y  
u+8de". ' The fact kh8t the 
%pbod@ of 1m. 
The Fifth C o n p m  met eight montha 
of the German proletariat, when all the 
tb catastrophe Id already come dearly 
it was not no very mcemary t o  see something 
lee that which wm. The fandameatal taak 
Congms wae ant, that &is 
l d y  ca?ld by ita name, its Meubjedi~ew ca 
tern, for all tbh ro t b k  
a d  to initiate it in the neceesary new methods of def-. I 
rtrqde and organhatiod eweolidation until the amid- 
mf  a new change in the situation. 
But in all thae questions the Comgresu adopa- d-  
m d h d y  opposite attitude. 
Zmviev ddned the 
tha Congress in the 
& '  . f ' ; .  r 
I 
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."'$op.in arnnged mttem nrJ dig ritb tht 
-tion of bin. He raw the maiP in atbar 
'The overeatim&tion of the dtaation war not th 
mmt. It is much worse - an the -pie of S m y  
&owed-that there are still numeroue social demoamtie 
remnants left in the party." (PEAVD~, Jurae 84  1924.) 
Zinoviev did not see tbe catastrophe, yet he did not 
rtand alone in this. The whole Fifth Congrees eimply 
pasred over this greatest defeat of the world rewlation 
together with him. The German events were consided 
there principdy from the point of view of the policy of tho 
$ Communists . . • in the Saxon Ladtag. In ib resolukiom, 
% the Congress approved the E.C.C.I. for having 
I* 0 ". . . condemned the opportunistic prodnre of the 
P Qerman Central Committee and ia bk $r#t @me ita 
perverted application of the united front tactic during the 
- Saxon government experiment." (Puma, June !M, 1994.) 
Then after the " saxon qeriment " had ha 
e o n h e d  and Brandler deposed, there followed n &ugh 
pasring on to the order of the day. 
"The general perspective," &aid Zinoviw, aad &e 
Congress with him, " remainn fundamn* the same. The 
mtuation is pregnant with revolution. New clrsr atrugglen 
a- heady  in motion again. A gigantic struggle ia on thr 
, march . . . " ( P u n &  June 24, 1924.) 
; How fragile and mutable ia such ULeftisrn which 
7 regarda emry gnat minutely snd overloola the camels. Bat 
those who considered the situation wi tb  a d n g  eyes and 
puabed the significance of the October defeat to the fore 
pound, tho~e  who pointed out the 8ubsequemt WJ 
period of revolutionary ebb and tramitory eollsolidatb~ 
(''~tabilization") of capitalimn with all the politiad 
eomequencee ari~ing from it, the Menhip of the Fifkh 
C o n p s  endeavored to  stamp crr opportnrrist~ and liqui- 
dators of the revolution. Zinoviev and Bucharin saw their 
main task in this. Ruth fiche?, who together with than 
a a d e r ~ 8 h t d  the defeat of the p&oua yes*, saw in ths 
Russian Oppaition t lb bu of tb p s r ~ p u c t h  of 1IBOldBf 
mOXEP.  L l P O L W T I O f  
d t y  for the defeat d e d  most 
that is, a g h t  thme who did not 
Meat aa a viatory. Thua Kofsrov I 
lpho had c h a m w  the deferrt of the B 
The'defeatl of the party were d e & h  m i # k  h:. - 
hntead of a d y ~ h  of the defat-a b 
matic a&-adulation all alwg the line. A Bohhdst 
&a*, however, is incompatible with a d f c 9 a ~  
mdhr  K o l a d o m .  
The work of the Fifth World Cmgrea contained tea 
r little of what K ~ B  correct and n-rary. Tbas the 
Levi, Khra Zddn a d  
" . . . them in no w e  of the mtoration of 
-pi-'' (PSAVDA, June !28,1924.) 
But daring the year, when the restoration wan bdafsdlgl 
&tend '' stabilktion ",. it waa cautioasly &d 
by Varga afkr the eoent. The Opposition was then h a d 7  
accwed of not recognizing the rtabibtion, for it had 
&red to entablish the c o m m e n c ~ t  of it a fear a d  r 
half More. and aIreudy p r m i v d  in 1926 t e h  thnt 1 
undermine this etabilkation. Whidirsr E R Q W ? )  1 1 T h e  Fifth Congregn saw political wenb and p o l i t i d  - 
groupings on1 J in the distorEBd mi- of a falne orientation. i Thb condition also mprang from ita d u t i o n  which char- 
acterid the Rusehn Opposition ar a 'petty-bourgeois 
deviation". History comded this &take in ita own way 
by forcing Zinoviev, the mein prowcutor at ;t Fifth 
C a n p s ,  to admit two yeare later that the kernel of the 
Opposition had been correct in all the fndmentai dbpnta, 
T h e  bade strrrtegical mistake of the Fifth Congreu 1 
neeesaarily had aIso to ariae out of a lack of uudemhdhg 
of tbe proce~sea dewdoping within the German d the 
international social democracy. At the Congr- only itr 
M n e ,  decay and collapse were epokem of. 
ffioviev said the foUowing with regard to the lad 
E e i h t a g  elections which yielded 8,700,000 vbtes for the 
Communist Party of Germany: 
#If on the field of parliamentari~m in Gtermaqy w 
have a proportion of 62 Commnaiata to  100 rocial demo- 
crats, it mnet be proof to  every one that we are a p p ~ ~ : h h g  
t h  c m g u ~ b  of the majority of the German workimg h s . "  
(Pnam~, Jane 92,1924.) 
Zinoviev mderstoud nothing of the dynsmic~ of WJ 
pmcew. The influence of the C.P.G. in that a d  the 
fo110wing year8 did not grow, but fell comkntly. The 
8,700,000 votes represented only an impressive mmmnt of 
the idwmce that the party had over the majority of the 
German proletariat towards the end of 1928. T h i ~  nmber 
aodoubtdy had to fafl in the ~ub~equent eIectiOm. 
In the meantime, the social democracy, which went to 
piems in 1923 like a rotted tmn of e h w ,  began to - , 
' + ' L  
-7 - 
% 
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t h e d e f e a t o b t h e r e v o ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t e  . 
apandtOgmlr#tbrd~hatirmora,abii(bBSf~&* ; 
BqmIe of khe C o m m ~ t s *  . , . 
Tbe feet tbat We had for%aeen . .2: 
8 W have hem overlooked - m a  put down a~ ths 4' 
,r gf our “p&inrnn. In it necessary now, d :, +*<- .:.L4 ,  
' ,-Hay ele&onn in which the social democrab - - + -  \. <a 
khan 0,000,000 v o w  e t i I l  to prwe that we wm *+ J- 
: at the begianing of 1924 we said and &o [ C:.-I 
i h a certain pe&d a rebirth of the mc*l demome &..&a ,,&dbg1y take place, whil, the "ophbts", d m  &I@$& 
. ~g red the m a 8  for the mu tb+ ~ d . l  w- 'fkJ 
...EJ, iqe fimwlp mht.lenF A b w  dl# tha !+-% 
'; thngrem of the Catintam was &o grievody mLI.lue :$ 
!&e r e c d  youth of the rooial democracy is aa- -"' :'- 
*mt .tCiag- The collape of the ~ o d d  demoeno~ h k 
$b?&ab4 yet the period up to its fall ia uncerbh ft a 2 3 :  
;h not depend ujpon u. To shorten this period, om mprt - 
~ 7 -  of all know how to look fads in the eye, to rem&m , - 
time the tarn of the politid uit~~tion,  to
-! fate M defeata and to  learn to foresee the a 
If the Geman #mid democracy e t i l l  repreeenb a farm 
ny milliom today, derived right from the working ; 
, then there a m  two direct caueea for it. Pint, & . 
t o f t h e ( k m a n p a r t y i n t h e f d o f l s a 8 d ~  :: 
&I fahe ntrategicul orientation of the Fifth Congmm. - 
If in the begbhg of lM4 the relation between the 
ial democrata at the electiom warn 1 ,  
relation grew worse after four m& 
ttle more than 1 to 8. So that, -!. 
wt draw doaer in th ia  p r i d  to tbe ' f. 
of tht working h, but dm 3 . And that in npih of an inddihw r 7 '3 
of our party ip x w e d  yearm, which with, C' ,:_' -4, 
point of ** :;- 
of the & t i ~  taken by the Fifth 
b it not already clear ww h t  a BolshwH &&* 
cannot be spoken of seriously if one dow not ande~t*nd 
the basic curve of our epoch in its entirety as w d  ap in 
its individual windings, which have the ssme aignihanee 
at particular moments for the party laderrhip, as tail~ay 
curve8 have for the locarnative engineer? T o  put on 
#team on a sharp railway curve absolutely meam to fall 
down the slope. 
Despite all that, it in only o few month8 ago that 
Puma had to  acknowledge with more or 1-8 distinctneae 
the correctness of the rstimate I already gave kowlrds the 
a d  of lm. On January 28,198, P E A P ~ ~ ~  mote: 
"The wave of a certain apathy and oppres-8 
which set In after the defeat of 1923 and permitted Geman 
capital to rtrengkhen ita position, is beginning to paw.' 
So the " certain " oppmniveness, which held awey h c a  
the fall of 1928, is first beginning to pae5 in 19% These 
words, which have come to light after a delay of four yearr, 
constitute a clumsy condemnation of the false orientstion 
bnpplied by the Fifth Congreee, but at the same time a h  
of that myetem of leadership which does not reveal and 
examine the errorn committed but veil8 them and thereby 
only inereasas the ideologia1 confusion. 
A draft program which brings no evaluation of the 
events of 1928 end the basic mistake of the Fifth Congra, 
#imply turns 'its back oa the real queations of a revolu- 
tionary etratem of the proletariat in the imperidkt epoch 
6. T h e  " D e m o c r u t i c - P a c i f i r r t H  Era and 
P a d a i r m  
The capitulation of German Communkm in the f d  
of 1888, which -wed the threat* pwkbrhn drrmger 
with a minimum of civil war, inevitably had to .Rendrea the 
pi t i on  not only of the Commuxiint party but dm of 
L 
Paeciem. For even a civil rrar in which the bowgwbh b 
viotorioun andormha the foundations of eagitdbt ergloit 
ation. A d y  at that time, that is, at the d af 1998, we 

e l e ~ ~ b a t t o a ~ t & r & & o ~  
a d  the English Labor Party, 
AE a counterpoime to fhie new hostile front, it &odd 
&.pe k pointed out that bbourgeoie E m p  wiU be &le 
I -  ta maintain iW only an a 0nancial vesoal of the United 
' Itah d that the paoitlsln of the l a w  only up* 
f m  the endesvox to put Europe on hangw rations, 
h&ead of making this perspdive the pint  of deprtum 
of the new atrugg1e a@t the r d  democfaey, with ib 
new religion of Americanh, the leadership of the Comk 
tern &re&$ its attack again~t the oppaaite side. It 
hputed to  us the idiotic theory of e nomabed i m p  
ridim, put on dmericaa mthu, without warn a d  
~ 0 ~ l l t i o n 3 .  
Xn the very same February nessiosu, in which & 
PmaitIiiam of the E.CCJ.-f oar momthe before the CongFesr 
dedared that the armed uprising 4 t d  m d y  a d  
urptlyn on the order of the day for the G e w  party, 
it ale0 gave the following e~timatim of the Bicuation im 
France, which was jwk at ,that time approaching the 
'%eftn psrIiamentary dections : 
UThis revivd (before the dectima) h y a  deeb 
only tbe most S i c a n t  and weakest parti- a d  t h d  
pWcd gwwpins~. The mocialist party bas been arotucd 
and m e  b d c  to  life under the rap of the a p p m  
w o w  .. (PMvR~, Fcbmrrp 7,lMW) 
Thu at r time in which a ~ Y G  of petty 
e t  Lef th  wadi quite obviody approaching ia Fmm, 
which dm embraced broad d o n e  of the w o h  rrnd 
wbkmed tha party of the prohkiat aa dl aa the Fsroirt 
pard  of capital, in a word, ths vichry af the 'Zdt 
W, the leademhip of the C d n h m  pmceedd from s 
-3 pmpeckb~ It &ilntly d d d  % por& 
bility of a padat  wave and m +ha ere of the May 1W4 
electiom  poke of the F d  A s E s t  puty, thc Xsft 
hme~bearer of petty bour&a padhi, as an M y  
llaeaa political grouping". At h t  time I prot&d 
qpimtc I i g h w e d -  . ". o f ~ s o d a l ~  
me: 
" We need expect no period now, no matter how br*, . 
of even an external pacScntion, my kind of extbdion . . . . 
Europe i entering into the stage of d e v e  e v m h  . . .- 
Germany is amreptly approaching a hqwml  aid .- 
war . . . " (PM- February 2,19534). 
Zinoviev, to all appearances, had completely forgot- 
*At tbe p-t moment the intermtiad 
! &raehmiged by F'aecism, by the state of 
To this quotation, Zinoviev added with gratification : 
*' This was slrid in 1922. Thus the Cornintern, already 
s year and a half ago, predicted w democratic-pacifist era? 
(PRAVDA, June 22,1924.) 
Congress construed the old p e r e ~  
mocrrtic" ere as a stage on the 
much too literally. Thus 50viev 
" I  repeat that preciscl~ the dremocratk-pncipt ma 
1 O a tign of fh8 decay and thr Lmrabb .critic [of eapi- 
taliern]." (Pnavlra, June 1, 1924.) 
This wodd have been corrmt had there been no Ruhr 
d a i s  and if evolution proceeded more planfully , without 
ruch historical "leaps". Thia would have been doubly 
id not achieve the 
d that in a form 
were able and had to h o m e  merely the tr 
sore of more reriow, firmer and more 
pa&icalsr had happened in Germany and Europe in the 
f8U of 1928; an epia-nd that waa dl. 
In order to ahow the conree and the lePel of thb 
, the bourgeoisie waa not cam- t o  come to ' p h P  
and 'democracy', but c m e  of itu free will, of free &kt, 
' it is pit ively embarraraing to d d  upon, two principal 
e w i o n a  are dram: 
m e  s d  democracy ie  aa objectively moxt moderate 
It might well be said that the social ~ O C ~ ~ C Y  b ths , 
Lit wing of burpk aociety. This ddamtion iu qnite 
oofitct if one dow not emntrtla it quite M) dmply and 
for@ that the mcid demoo~aay &ill lerda mi&m 
mawam that En&, who lived W o r a  
OW* w g ?  8 t h  &tea fonm: 
WWlont ndi [BoUtdk] pa& no 
a k h A i p  rm p d b h  under the 
. . - '- . 
PB1 1 W S K V 1 9 1  0s  -P%) - 
But for dl ruch a ptpmmemt did dM 
ng to Std& it b true, but aceording to 
WkdeIf * 
d u d  (no w to tie it up with &ti pa%), irr fax - 
rationel and aorrect than ths a d B t d h  qrratsd 
nhw, whi& in hm b esreatiany only a sobema of the i ' Nifth- B t i n , t h b b i i d e p f o m d d o r  r 
ii 
~otyekmtththeqwstiom T h e p ~ m s f f i e b d m W a ,  
a & t r t h s ~ c a o f t b e l a & d a o r d e , w 5 l l n a t ~  
k .  \n'thotlt a &ra&rhtion of the m u t i o m g  i h a h  
1 &a origin end disapparaam without pinking olrt the dm& 
L 
t- 
miltab ia ttte estimation of %he without m 
-tion of how the l o ~ ~ ~ a  mud a& at h 
? #  i ' ~ , ~ w i t b ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ i a t o t b s ~ t h e ~  
* t t h e r e e a n b e & ~ t i ~ ~ i a ~ t b e ~ u f *  
F - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ p ~ ~ r ~ o f ~ t a ~  
F, ~ P E  
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adoption of this attitude 
With thin, aa in general 
lation. The policy of Lenin had d i g  in ~ ~ m m o n  *?T: 
licpdationiam, Yet it had juat as little t o  do Kiah s && +,' 
regard of the changa in the objective mta~tion, or dl& - 
the mainteaam of the course of armed uprising by mem:' ' 
woda at a timb when the molntion had aIrelrdp hrd"'. 
its back upoh w, and a long road full of atabbom, I& ;' 
matic, laborious work among the masma to prepare the pw 
for a new revolution lay before m. 
Wbcn a man r r d  the etair~ he needn m e  kind d: 
motion, but when be d u d  it-*. M a  ' 
dangerous I auch a dtnation in which a man pub out the ' 
. light md raiw bia fmt to ascend when theee are tbrad 
downward ~tep before hint. A cranb injarim am? d h b  
atim are unavoidable. The lademhip of the Comintclrrr 
h 1994 did Wh'i to lnpprws a a&& of tbs '. 
experieneee of the Geman Octokr, Iikt dl critieimn -in.. . 
gcwrsl. It mtubbornly: The workers am 
h t e l y  approaching the revolution-the stain 
upward. b it then ~ t o x h h g  that tbe diredhu 
Fifth Co- applied in revolutiomwy ebb wumm 
to lead to buvy politid ' c d m  and d i s l o c a ~ ?  
Xn No. 5-6 of the I ~ m m a t i o l l  h&tk of the 
Oplp#ition, March 1, lQW, it mnp: 
&. 
I 
I .  
* . , O L L  
so a correct and 
the individud program dema&P (My emphasis. LT.) 
The main year of the tarn was the year 1984. Nevw , = 
thelesr the recognition of thh ensuing abrupt tarn . 
("stabilixation") falloffed d y  a yesr and a hnlf La*. 
Whst is astonishing hem, since the y a m  M4$-2& wem - 
We are aot writing a hidory of the C o d n h n  for thQ 
k t  h e  yearn. We bring here ody a f d u d  illuminatiom 
I 
of two etrategid I h m  in the f m d a m d  n t a p  of W a  
@od-an i u ~ t i ~  of the hollownw of the M 
program for whicb; dl thew qudaa  do mot evca 
W O L P D  1 C S V O L V T I O I  
We o r d  therefore give here a des 
I I h i u n e  - everywhe~ the Commanista had 
decisions of the Fifth 
heavy chain. Every Bingle party, one more, 
k a m e  a victim of the falee points of dep 
&d a f k  phantoms, eompletelg ignored 
trwformed revolutionary slogans into 
compromised themarelvea in the 
J1 the ground under their feet. 
of the Cornintern waar deprivd 
In the same measare that an 
W r a m  rrrra~msr ar ~ w i  
proletarian vanguard a g h t  the boargeohie a d  p e m t  
demagogy for iduence upon the moat dieenfrllltchbed 
poor, wa0 ulwap more and more dieplrcd by the 
b p s  for a direct and independent mlutionary x81e of tbt 
, peasantry on a national iu w d  as on an international =ale. 
In the courst of the whole year of 1924, that ia, the 
main year of the " stabilization ", the Communist press was 
constantly Wed with completely f antar tic information on 
the atrength of the lately founded Pearants' International. 
Dombal, the representative of the latter, declared that the 
Pearanta' International, six months after ib formation, 
already embraced a few million members. 
There was enacted the scandalous incident of the leader 
of the Croatian 'TwantaS' Party, Itaditch, who c m i d e d  
it advieable to  rhow himaelf in Red Moacow on the road 
from Green Agram in order thereby to  rtrengthen bin 
miniaterial chancea in White Belgrade. On July 9, 1984, 
Zinoviev, in his report to the Leningrad party workern on 
the malts of the Fifth Congress, told of a new "victory": 
LLAt tbis moment m important turn b taking place 
within the peasantry. You have all rurely heard already of 
the Croatian Pewants' Party of Raditch. Raditch is now 
in Moocow. There - ie a real people's leader . . . Behind 
Raditch stands united the entire poor and middle peasantxy 
of Croatia . . . Raditch hw now dk4ded in the name of 
his park J to  join the Peasants' fntermkional. We consider 
this event very importank . . . The formation of the 
Peasants' International ia an extmordinarily great event, 
Some comrades did not believe that a big organhtion would 
grow out of it . . . NOW we are getting a greet anriliary 
-e p a n t r y  . . . (Puma, July 28,1994) 
And eo forth and more of the a w e .  
The leader, LaFOnette, eompondd on the other side 
of the 0-n * Mpe w 6  I&', 
The reprwmtativc of the Co&tern, Pepper, ia o*r to 
ret Htbe sarilimy m a & h n 4  American farm- 
into motion at an accelerated tempo, drew the young and 
weak American Communist Party inba tbe sensdwa agd 
rhameIeua adventure of crm- r "farineplabor part? 
~Kolarov reported : 
"In the United States t h e  mall fermem have e m -  
From Nebrmkr came Green - one of the - .&& 
LaFoIlekk orgadsation- to the ~ a n b '  m q p m  in 
Xmeow. For rome reaeon or other he alno j&edH, ia 
:order, as is cwtomery, t o  help along later on at a d e r -  
emce in St. Paul to atraqle the Cwtmlmiet purky when it 
made the weak attempt to go over to the *eHan of 
Fepper'e great plans. T h e  eame Pepper who ma c-ellor 
to Count Karolyi and who put on an e x t d y  air 
at the Tbird Congrees as a refomer of Marxism The I .&me Pepper r h o  ru one of thor that butchered %he 
revolution in Hungary. 
PMPDA of A u p t  29,1924 compltzind: 
'The American probriat  w whole h a  llaa a*an; 
risen to the cmciowmn of the n d  for even m eadib 
rrtory a party M the Eng&h Labor Party is." 
And about a month and a l a d  More &at, Z h m h  
reported to the Leningrad party workere: 
"A fm dGm famma ura bsiag at 
iPPreohtta* p J w d  bg 8Ab 4grahn Mjtil aa at lf lX'al 
to  bRb wo&tg ctprg. (PMvD~, Jdy 99,193h) 
And Kolarov immediately added: a w o r M ' . d  
. n 
&uB + dam " f o d s t i o a  What th not proletarian, buk 
b * hracter waa eupponed to m e n ,  no raged&her oh 
er the other side of the ocean could point out. Ln the 
:&& rpa it was only r Pep- edition of the i&n af i 
?joint workem' and peasants' party", on which we dl yet 
have occaaion to  peak in greater debil in m & n  with 
the lessone of the b e e  revelation. Here it ie enough to 
Peaeanta' Xnternatiod 
1 
etablhh that thia reactionary idea of no-proletdm but I 
cIaas partiea arose entirely from the pseuda-left poky of 
1924, which, when it loat the ground from under ib feet, I 
c l u n g t o ~ t c h , ~ o I l e t t e a n d t h e ~ t e d ~ r e s o f  %he ,;C
7 '  
' W e  are now witnesses,"-proclaimed the a-aa J 
of cmmonplacee, Miliutin - UEo an extraordjandy impor i ! 
tunt and w c n n t  example of the eplittlng away of the 
peasant maesea from the hurgeohie, the mmbg forth of 4 
the paantry and the working clews in the eapi-t 
scraatriea in struggle against the capitalist mystem." 
(PEA-, Jdy 97,1994.) 
In tbe oonme of the whoh year of 1924, the prw of 2ba 
-Cornintern did not . t ire of telling about the ganeral 
W t w a r d  trend of the peasant maam", aa though eome- 
k h g  independent could be expected from thie, in moat 
cases only apparently Leftward t r d  of the paanta in a 
,a 
period of the open Rightward trend of the workers, the 
rtrengthening of the social democracy and the consolidation 
' of the bourgeoisie. 
We encounter the same mista%e in politid vision 
tomrdu khe end of 1927 and the beghmbg of 1998 with 
regard to China. After every gmat and deep d i m ,  in 
which the proletariat adem n dechive defeat for a long hrlnd 
time, the +tation @kill continua for r long t h q  amwg 
the semi-proletarian masees in city d c d r y ,  like the 
c W  h the water when a done ha8 f d e n  iP. 00 that ' 
when the leademhip a e c r i k  sn imhpdent significance to 
*ae  c i d e r  and, contrary to the prom8 within the woxkhg 
&so, points to  them am r eymptwa of an app- rev- I 
olution, we know that tbia is an infdlible &xi that ths 
W p  is once more m&bg advemtum, ae WM the 
W O L E D  I C I V O Z I U T X O ~ -  
in E h n i a  or Balgaria in 1924 or Canton in fW7. w 
During the same period of d 
Commdt Party waa driven for 
perid,  not only R d t c h ,  Laollette, fhe m y t h i d  
. mim waa replaced by the hope for the mi 
u ~ t i w  of the d+ spparatw of the 
for &e prposw of the revolution. Orrt of tb 
d o  op- the later policy of tbe AnglwRua 
tee, which, sftcr the defeat in China, dealt as 
! 
k 
r T 8 1  I T I A T I O Y  0 1  THI 
Without the guty, -q of * +y, in 
.: ur apo$on of khe party, t h r o e  a ruhtitute for the park$ 
rwohtiw can never triumph. *t im the 
of the last decsde. It ia tnte thak the 
anioar earn beoQme a pwetfut lever for the 
revolutioa They can, for example, d e r  
nd at a certain period, even replace 
, Yet they can nerer play much a Ab 
oqmunist party a d  certainly not a&nd it, 
the condition that Cummrrnist inhence 
$0 t k  die a d  w $ k w r  of the 
-8 for t h  poktarirrrr rmoktiom - w have bad to pay 
too dearly to  be able to renounce it lightly or even to have 
it d a d . ' '  (Tmtsky, Voluma $, pqe 9.) 
The same problem is dealt with in wen greater detail 
in the book W X t b  E l l g W  ? T b i ~  book, from ite very 
fhet page, ia devoted to the p-htion of the ides &at 
evm the E+h revolution cannot m i d  the portale of 
Commmim, and that with a correct, c o o r q p u a  end 
intrsmigeant policy which eteera clear of any illmiom 
with regard to circaitow mutes, the E+h Commanist 
Party can grow by leap and bouadg and matare ao ar to 
be spud in the coarse of a few yeam to the kmka before it. 
The Leit illdona af 1W mra f o r d  up with the 
aidofuRi#tlea- ~ a a t a b s a b l e t o c o d f b s  
~ o f t b e m i l ~ a d M e a f r e f 1 9 9 8 f m m h  
m r r s H u f r m o n a # l f , f h r p ~ d t t r e R i & t ~  
~ t m r ~ p b i n t h e p ~ l r i a t h a d t o l m d e a i s d  
and ~ ~ o ~ r y  pmcemm within the 6 t h ~  clamma opti- 
d d i d l y  exaggerated. That wao tbe beginning of the d m -  
~ f ~ E k p ~ t i a n t o f h s C l e a t r b t , t h & t k , 6 6 t h s  
petty bur@ lint which, in the coum of the further 
+lopilag mhbilhtiba, h d  to h h  h l f  fmm ik 
dtm-I& 8 h d  a d  be m v d d  &a * trade -bmy i 
b, in the U.S.B;&, in in Bn&a& in 
.oa-@-* . - .  
8. T h e  P e r i o d  of Bight-Cet 
D o w n - S l i d i  
The policy of the most import& 
decided upon at the Fifth Congwe~, wan &@d ikW 
to h completely hadequate. The mistmb mf * 
'Zeftismn which hampered the dedapemt of 
Comdt  parties, later gave the impetna C new 
dg-zrg deviations, to  ton scderatd  dkbg  h to 
Right. Whem people are burned by het rrrilk, 
to Mow cold on water too. The Left " Central 
of r d o l e  aeries of parti- wlere just wr vioMy 
aa they bud been constituted Wore the F a  -.
' The adventmist Leftism gave way to an open o p p o r t ~  
* of the Right-Centrht type. To camprebend the 
and the tempo of th i  orgmbt iopd Bi-rd *, it 
* must be recded that S t a h ,  the leader of thia tarn, bQclt 
in Sephher lIs4  chubaracte~ the ]pawing of ~ F Q  
leaderehip to  Maslow, Ruth FSaAer, Tmint, 
Ghdt m d  others, a8 the expmion of tbe BobhevhW 
of the parties and an amwer to the bemsndn uf %B 
Bobhmik workers who, on their way to  the 
"want to  ham molutionary leadera" too. 
Stalin M e ,  " . . . the last half year in mtermrtbf I# 
the respect that it brought a fundament4 revered m h life 
of the Communiet parties of the Week, in the rmue h t  the 
roeid demomatic remnants were decisively liquidated, tbe 
party a d r e s  Bobhevised and an iolation of the opporhn- 
ht elements took pbce." (PEAVDA, 8eptemk e0,lm.j 
But only ten month later the genuine 
d urewlutionary leaders" were declared rocid d-fr 
q and rrxgrde., o u ~ t d  from party kidemhip and out d the party. 
Despite the pani 
leaders, frequently by 
hema of the appamtw, 
can tSe drawn bctrreen the 





z? - - - *a . T K E  I P f A 5 l B Y  OF Tm* 
k,' . . 
1 .;- f a ~ ~ @ f t h t i R d ~ r g * s r d ~ o f ~  
. U.8SX.. of the c o l d  bour&ie, of the " 
in the cqitalht countrim, of addm in one 
* -try, of .the db of the party in the prohturim 
- Man, the revisioniet ~ c k a  already appeawd in f u k t  
blm in lW4-25. They cloaked t h d -  with the banner 
of the etruggle against UTrot~k+?' a d  fomad their 
moat distinctly upportuht erpmlion in the -1uti- of 
#a April 19435 conference of the C.F.S.U. 
T h  aa a whole, the coumc to the Wt m t a  
tke attempt at a h d - b W ,  parely empirical and belstd 
daptation to the retardation of mmlutionary d d p m a t  
c u d  by the defeat of 1W. T'he original utcitde of 
B u ~ a q h m a l r e a d y b e e n ~ w ~ b a s e d w t h t  
"pemmmt'? development of the revolukk, and that in 
the literal, purely mechanical conception of the word, 
Baahark granted no %reatling sped"' interrPptiann or 
retreab of any kind and considexed it 8 revolutionary duty 
to continue the "off'enaive" andw dl cireametmces, 
In the above quoted a r t i d q p ~ g r a m w W  in t p  
bf S t a h ,  Om t b  I ~ f m w t M  whiob -titub 
the very &et 8ppm'II.Ce of skdh a m h t i 0 d  q e  
tiom, we are shorn that the aathox of the draft 
program also profead the very same p d y  meahmid 
'Wtn conception in the very k t  pwiwl of the s t w e  
a p b t  "Trotskyism9', For this coaqtion, only a "&- 
inkegration" of the social democracy, a ' 2 e f t w a d  turn" 
of the workera, e "growth" of ttte ComnPnist partie8 and 
a am Uappmacb'? of the rewrlutien, d t e d  alwaya and 
unalterably. But he who could look about himu& and 
dbthphh thingo war and is a "EqaidstoP. Thb mew 
"tendency" required r year and a half to oheme wme 
dhiag new after the change in the eitaatiom m Ewop in 
1988 so aa then to transform iW, pdc-stricken, iato itm 
op@. The leaderahip orientated iW, without any 
r y a W c  udmhnding of o w  epoch and itr inner ke= 
dmwiee, only aceording to f e e h p  (Stah) and each time 
W d  the frapentary c o n c l h  thw obhbd.with s b  
b t i c  rcb- (Bncharin). The political lige w s whol+ * 
Mort, forms a chain of h, the ideoMd bad. 
a k M o ~ c 0 p e o f s c h ~ t a h t ~ e e e r f r ~ u f ~  
Btalinint d p a g  to abeurdity. 
The Sixth Coqgreas would act c o d y  if d e d d  
to elect a npccial c o d a i o n  which d 
guther d those theoria created by Bueharh, fa 
ody for motivating the varioue etrrges 
Rmsian Committee. The commission would 
I these theoriw together chronologically and bring t h b  a symtm ao $8 to attempt to draw a malarial idea. contained in them. It wodd become ose of d& q; 
i 
instructive atrat.8;caI diagrams. The same also W r 
the Chinese revoltltion, fie economic developrment Mi* 
U.S.S.B. and also every less imporhnk question. -- 
daapiricism mtdtiplkd bg a c l h o ~ t ~  that in €he 
that e t i l l  aweits it8 condemnation The e f f d  I courne ahowed themelm mast fstalIy in the thee IQQ#. 
t important questions : In the infernal policy of the U*B.&% 
in the Chinese revolution and m the question of the 
Rwaian Committee. In the r m e  dirdion, pven if 
obvious and las fatal Kith regard to c o ~ e n e e s ,  
political questions. 
course of the Cornintern war also re- ia all other 
, So far aa the internal queetione of the U8.S.R. ara 
concerned, a edcientlyl detsiled chsractehatiait of ttmQ ' 
policy of down-sliding ie g i v a  in the P b t f w m  of 
Bohbdk-htinh t1 ( O p p t i f  hm) *. We muat limit o d v e s '  
here to  a reference to this Platform. The Plrrbfom how 
ever, now receiveg an apparently unexpecked wniirmak4m 
by the fact that d the attempb of the present Wdip 
of the C.P.S.U. to free it& from the conaepumma of the 
policy of the yeare 1928 to  1928 are based u p  h o s t ;  
Nerd quotatione from thin P h t f o m  whose authors rlsd 
adherents are disprsed in .prisons arsd erile. The fad, 
howmr, that the present leademhip has recourue to tha 
Pht fom only in sections and particles, without oODlBeCfiQpD 
*PubIirhed In Ths R d  13lttrPtfon In Eh8ahq b m: 
a4. Hanoun and h., New Pork, IMB. 
rn T H f  I T S A T l B Y  OW T I =  
o l ~ e d u i t h t h e o t k , ~ t h a ~ L e f t t t l r n ~ ~  
a ~ m d ~ , b a t a ~ t b e a s s r e t I m e g i V e r t h r  
. h b f m m ,  as the generalized of a real. hdnbt 
mume, an dl the grenter V&ML 
In tha Pktftim, the queation of the Chinese rewlntim 
b d d t  with hdcient ly ,  not concretely and in part &- 
M y  feloely (Zinaviev). In cornideration of the d d h  
hprtamce of this qwtion for the Gmhtem we are obliged 
ta aubject it t o  a more detailed heskigation in a 4 p 4  
8eCtion (q*. 
So f&r es the A q b B d o a  C o m a h e  iu c o n e e m 4  
the &ird moat important question from the ~tr&gi~d 
q d m c e a  of' the hmhtern in the k t  p r B ,  there only 
mmah for as, dter all that has already been rsid by tbe 
nrrs up the reaultn here bridy. 
The point J departure of the AngXa-Bmrian Committe~ 
Opwtion in a .uia of artidea, and thaw, to ? 
a8 we have already mn, lay in the impatient endeavor to 
laq over khe young and too dowly developing C o m m d t  
party. !Chin circamotance lfave &e M e  er-t s 
falae character even before the md stFiIte. 
The hglo-Ruaaim C o m d t h  waa perceived not ss 
j d  a purely episodic bloc of I d e m  that w d  hevitnbIy 
have to  be and would be demomtr~tively brokea at the 
&st aer io t~~  test in order to compromise the General C o d  *, mot only St&, Bucharin, Tomsky and othere, bat &o 
Zinoviev saw in it a long hating Hfriendahip", an hh- 
ment for the systematic revolntioni%rkion of the Engbh 
working maasear, and if not the p t q  at least t 6 e  threshhold 
of the gate over which the revolution of the En&h prole 
tariat would stride. The further it went, the mope the 
Anglo-Runsian Committee became tramformed from m 
e p i d c  anderstanding into as inviohble principle that 
8 t o d  abwe the red class otruggle. That h a m e  obviow 
at the t h e  of the fpneral a*. 
*PllIbUlbed In tbe -Met m e  D m  Program d the , 
m t m w  hkm4mml''. br 4 s n  Tmts4. The -, H w  
Ywk, m* 
Tbe entry of the mmr ma-t inh  the opdy d m -  
Gonary mtage threw btak into & cmp of * hq& 
mdion even those liberal labor plitician~ who bmgma 
samewhat Left. They betrayed the generd d r i h  @ 
and deliirately a d  then ale0 nnde& d bgtrajd be 
mined at&. The possibility of betrayat iu * 1 . ~  
imbeddd in reformism. That d w  not mean of ,W 
- refomism and Wrayal are o m  and the same & 
I moment. Temprarg agreement9 may h m d e  rrith b reformiate, if they take a step forwad But ta maia-h- 
bloc with than when they commit treason ehody Mmm 
€he development of a movement, s i g d e a  a crimiaal 
lessness towards the traitom d a v e h a  of h v a l .  
The general striae had the b k  of exerting a u & d  
preeaure upon the employers and the state with the p o w  
of the five million workera, for the qmtiw of mining rm 
M n g  the most important question of atate p&c J.  
T h d ~  to  the betrayal of the leadership, the strilce war . already strangled in the h8t stage. It was a very 
illusion still to believe after that that an isolated e c o d  
st* of the mine workera alone would achieve that which 
. &e general atrike did not achieve. 
That ir p r h e l g  m h r 8  tL ponk  of thu Onunl 
C a d i  Eog. It aimed with cold cdcaIation at the defeat 
of the mine workers, in the course of which co&rbBa 
e&m of the workers would be convinced of the "correct- 
m'' and the "common sense" of the Judar dimtiow 
of the General Comcil. 
The retention of the f r i d h i p  bloc with the General 
Council, with eimultarteous support of the l i a e  
economic strike of the mine workers, agaiast which the 
Qeneral Council came forward, wau so t o  epesk calculated 
to make it possible for the heads of the trade u n i o ~  
come out of this heaviest test with the lightest pod'bk 
loss of coddeme. 
The r81e of the Russian trade unions here, from the 
revolutionary standpoint, war 8 very unfavorable a d  pd- 
tively pitiful one. Certdnly, support of sn economh s* 
coe~r an hohted one, was abmlntdy necearsv Tfsete m 
Be no two opiniom on that amow nvolatidts. Yet thin 
support should have borne not only r f b d a l ,  but a h  n 
revolutionary-politid character. The Aa-1ussien h t d  
Council of Trade Uniona abould have declared openly to  t ? ~  
Engli~h mine workersy d o n  and the whole El;@bh war* 
clam that the mine worked mtrike eanld priwslg: -ant 
upon success only if by ite ~ t u b b m a ,  ita tenacity d 
its impetus, it could prepare the way for a ~w m t b d  of 
tk gmmd rt&e. That c d  have been achieved, however, 
only by an open arid direct atrugetle q&ut the ljknernl 
Council, that of tht g o v e m m d  and the mining 
employers. The etruggle t o  wwert the economia atrike 
into a political str ike sigdled, therefore, an inteflse polif- 
ical and organizmtional war a- the h e r d  Council. 
The erst etep to such a war ld t o  be the break with the 
Anglo-Russian Committee which had h o m e  a renctionary 
obstacle, a chain on the feet of the working clare. 
N o  revolutionint who weigh him words will contend 
that r victory wouk2 huwe bum patmtcd along thin 
direction. But a victory wae pmoibb odv on thiu rod. 
A defeat on such a road, which can lead totm to vi-, 
would bring home lemons, that ir, implant the revolutimmry 
idea in the working class. In the meantime, mere h n d d  
rappork of the lingering and inertricabk trade union 8 t h  
(trade Mion strike--in ita methob: rewlutionar y-politid 
-in its aim) only meant gr is t  to  the mill of the &nerd 
Council, which could wait calmly until the crumbling of the 
rtrike wan forced by stamation and it was thereby proved 
that it ('was right''. It waa of course not m y  for the 
General Council to  await this end as sn o m  etrikebreaker 
for several month. Precisely for this very critical perid 
did the General Council need the Anglu-Russian Committee 
aa  it^ politics1 protection from the masses. In 
the questions of the mortal class combat 
capital and the proletariat, between the General c . W d  
and the mine workers, were, so to speakJ tr-formed into 
qwtiona of 8 friendly d i s c n ~ ~ i o n 4 w k w m  tbt two a h  
of the bIoe, the Englieh General Coand and the A&Ruaaisn 
Centrid Council of Trade U&OM~ on the nubject d wbkh 
agreement, that b, the 
' M o n  of the friendly c6dismsionn in favor of the 
The obstinacy w i t h  whidi the retention of the blw . with the General Council warn advocated, which m u  c o x m r k d  
to dixect r d t y  at the disgraceful Berlin session in A p d  . - 
1997, wau also motivated by reference to the %tabIt- 
of Enghh -pitaliem held out only with the aid of ths 
comemative power of the old labor orgadationa with all 
their currents and shadings, with the simultaneow weak- 
=sea a d  irresoluteness of the Enghh Communiet Party, 
On the field of the economic d ~odal  relations of Fa&ad, 
the revolution has already fully matured. The question 
n m r r t ~ p u r e I ~ p o l i t i c a ~ y .  T h e c o ~ 1 1 ~ 8 t ~ o f t h e ~  .- 
aationas formdby theheads of theLabor P d y  and* - A :. 
t d e  miom, whicb, in En-, pment a rrnited wh& 
reference to the d t e n c e  of U s t a b ~ t i ~ n ' '  aa an apolam 
for the politid bloc with -1. Yes, p d y  in order 
to rhotter the rkbikution, Auddom had to  be destroyed, 
ibtfem all. In such a sitnution, even a rhrdow of rofidaritf. 
d r i t h  t h e G e u e d C o d  b tBe p a k t  crime a d  ammrk 
sf i n f a  J agsimt the working massea, 
&tieally. The moat cliegraeeful defeat, which bar & 
'I What ars expectd from +he Aqlo-Busri*n Mth 
' fer the US.8.R. ? 
k Jdy lgaB, 8falin enli&tened QS at the joint pl- 
of &e b t r a l  Qmnittea and the Central W d  
Colaari*don a# f Q h :  
C(Tlbe task of this bloc [the &-R.C.1 d k  of h 
-tion of a broad moveanent of the mrrkbg daw 
*gab& hew imprb lb t  wara in general and ngaiast an h b  
; w n t i o n i n o a r ~ , u o ~ j a n t h e p ~ o f ~  
teri&es the W h h  trade UIii0tl8 8 B  
memory but in reality enterhim miserable illusions 
regard to their revoIutionism. 
After Stah,  the Moscow C 
&&red to the workers of Moscow: 
'The AagIo-riwsian Committee can and dl undo&+ - 
edly play an enormous r81e in the struggle againat all pow ' , 
sibh intemmtion~ directed against the U.S.S.B. It dl . . 
become the organiaatary center that embxacea the hbw 
national forces of the proletariat for the struggle agaimt 
evwy endeavor of the international bourmbie to  be& a 
new war?' (Tbuea of the Modcow C031WIOibba.) 
What did the Opposition reply: 
W e  more acute the international sitnation Mi - 
the more the Anglo-Rusian Camnittee win be t r w f o m  
into a weapon of Ehgbh and international imperih*. . 
Thia criticium of the Stnlinist hopes in Purcell crrr &a 
gnardian amgel of the workera' state was later &am& . 
by Stalin at the name plenum w a deviation 4- . - 
Leqbiarn to Trotskyhm". 
VomehiIov: Tew true." 
A Voice: ~ o m s c h i ~ o ~  hae a x e d  his seal to it? 
Yes indeed, all that ie 
Jdy Pbum at which the 
d n r e d t o ~ t h e ~ t i Q n o f ~ e a t w " '  
W didope, which I hiad to quota here brie%y from 
sly arliex article What Did IF# -psct n d  WAS# Did Rtr 
Gut? ie far more d ae a itrategical lesson tbsn r whole 
&kt chapter on atrategp in the draft prognrm. The 
q ~ t i m :  mt as #xpct 4 d t  did ~w gstr 
oonst3kuk the prindpai rtrategid cribion in general 
must be applied at the S a h  Congrese to all quatima 
that have shod on the order of the day in receut yearn. 
6t will baen be d w i d y  that the strategy of the 
E.G.C.L, especially since the p r  19546, van a strategy of 
-1 dimemio~, f&e &&tiom, illaeione with regard 
to the -y a d  ineiknat sgainst e a p i d y  reliable a d  
prwve&g oo-&hters. In a word, it was the rotten 
etratqgy of R i g h t - C e o t ~  
8. T h e  M a n c % u v e r i s t  C h a r a c t e r  of 
R e v o l u t i o n a r y  S t r a t e g y  
At h t  sight it is h p d s e d v e  why the -- 
wring abilitf and "fleribilitf' of B o M  a t r a w  are 
p a d  over in complete silence in the draft. Out of thin 
whale e o h d  q & h  4 9  eae pint M taken, %a 
point on apemmts with the colonial borngeobi~ 
In the miantime, the opportmim of the wmmt period, 
wi th  ite Right dthtiona ever s t r o w ,  haa 
apgeareel predominantly under +he h g  of drat- =. The refwd ta go dong Psith unpepled,  and thereby 
dso h d d  mmbioationu, waa c h a r a c t e d  as lack of 
"&&bilitym. M w m v e r i n ~  ability rpas declared the bash 
pshciple of the majority. 5 m i e v  a b d y  ma3usuvered in 
1925 with Raditch and LaFolette. Stah md Buhria 
thereapon mlrmuvered Rith C h b g  Kai-SheBt, with ]Parcell 
and Kith the kulaks, Tbe naaaratua nmmuvers comtadv 
. s r i t h t h e p & y a t d ~ i m ~ ~ e r i ~ w i t h f h e  
appretw . 
A whole cow of a+h in manc~1vere for -1- 
e r * t i e m q t k m l t ~ * d p - t l y o f  
~amtantly to disgraceful faiturn. Io the mean- mmhb ' 
a~~ armed with the spparatua of the paw a d  a 
' d a ~ b w k e t h e ~ o f t h y o a n g p a r t i ~ r r a d t h e ~  
~u~ every time, clkng $:aia@k, Wang Cbjp w4, ' 
. -, tbe k&ks-all &me issued forth aa victwg b ,' 
-a# *as a a w ~ r r e r  O F  
aad for dl it piwk b hpmaed 
dmidmany$hipgingm&rn&kra. 
appH&q 13e u u ~ f a l  in smaller 
hppll at T af ,p& prowna A m d r  "maBoeaver can only d s B e  khe de&ian by.& tb pos- 
& i M y , d & h g h u r o f  r-greatmdfrw&h 
m a k  forma, DiBdeSea  in p m  on +he OOntmq, 
anud be om- with the aid of a manmaw. 
lThp ~ n h d c t i o a  betrsen the p d d u G t  a& th. 
b@ie is o* of pidple .  Tbuk is why fhe st-@ b 
b M h  the Chimse hr&& o m t i o n a l  and 
p o d  mamwmw~ and to a u k d i n a t e  khm ta h 
torid p1am in uo nmzwuver but u cm-b t~@* 
tion of the vexy great& Wennions. CWWB cannot ba 
d e d v d  Thh applies, consided hbWadlp, h dl tfPe 
&seu a d  here, in axi imndiuh sense, a h  to the d h g ,  
possdng &as of the exploiter mid the sdu~ated. 'Psbe 
mrH of the latter L 80 p t ,  the dm 
w dngd and &e orpm of Momation so mkita&ml 
t h a t a a a t t e m @ t c a d ~ & e m b y ~ s n t i n g o ~ a s  
aametbing other than ane L in reality, mu* to maelf \ 
being h the tr imWd af the memy. 
me c o n t r a  "%, wem thi u.%a.R und tbe mpi- 1 ? 
t a t  WOFM ia W of prindge. That iar why it is apoamwe 
towmwmeitlritbth-*dofzmaamver~QlrriBhthc ,& 
aid of dear, oped$ wbw143ed conceBonb %p C a l ,  
. n d b y u ~ $ h e & n ~ ~ ~ ~ i l t . ~ p r t s  3 '  
m m t b b ~ p p a t x s b e e i t e n d p s d a n d t b e ~  But 
wen khh d y  C&J&A himtdd p h  4by 
no meam fdeever. It is a grea& d - t k e p t h  €a k k v e  
&at the inbm&iad bmqphh e m  be '%ddhd" 
Mtil *e  on of socicmlism, that js, h t L 4 h e  p6miph 
aonfradi* can be aoemmme with. the uid of a 
Thia ~ e l f 4 e q t i o n  can m&tI+e So& rqutbk its +b. 
w y  an intermatimu1 poletirim m I u t i e  em Ehrak 
UB from the grifi* Mdti*. A ~~ can d 
either of a mncatkt ta the enemy, mi armqmmnk wikh s 
tunelf calculated retreat in oder to b p  the emmy fmm 
onepa throat, or M y ,  of the mkiq of partial demaadr 
and slogans in auch 8 sucoession aa muat b* a 4p jnao 
the cimp of the enemy. Theme ars the p r i n u ~ @ ~ ~ ~  
of munaver~. StilI athem, more e - d a r y  onen, Zlpuld h 
btanasd. Mot every mamuper ia by its nahm only 8n 
episode in At ion  to  the principle drategiod liaia of tJm 
struggla In manmavering a h  the Kua % T q  and khe 
e Anglo-Ruaaian C-these maet be kept befom a0 constantly aan the perfect -mple of r Mestddk and tint a B O W  mmmuver--the matter was juut the That which should have been ody a tactical +ode M- oped there to a strategical line and the d strate& buk 
(the struggle a-t the bourgeoisie and the r e f o d )  w- 
knocked into a aerim of hidental and small tactical e& 
nodes, which, moreover, had d y  a dewdive deet. 
Xn a mnm~mver, one mud al-p proceed Qrom tbe varg 
wont msnmptionn with regard to one's dve~arry to dm 
col~ressions are m d y  or with regard to the d* d y  
with whom arrangements w r e  cundded, end not from tha 
bs t .  It must be combntlv born in mind that the d v  
csa perhap become an eaemy by tomorrow. TI& a m  
also t o  such &ee as the peasantry: 
'We must h distruartfd t o w a d  the pearrantm, a l m ~  
organize ourselvee separately from it d be m d y  for a 
atrnggle ageinst it, in ro far as the PI=IB&W 
ry or anti-pmletak" (Lh, Volume 8, 
y no meam contradIots h t  p a t  a t r a w  
task of the proletarkt wich Ldm worked out for the 
0.st time theoretically as d aa pra&dly with m& #hd . 
profundity, the taek of tearing the erploited 10-r mtim ef 
the p a a n t e  away from the iduence of the bourgeoisie 4 
&ding them behind ue. Only, the alliance ldweeu the prole- 
trriat d the peasantq ha1 by no means been p d  
by &tory am s &rished creation, a d  can &o jwt ar 
little be created throu~h naaeeous manmum, oontemptihh 
attempts at wheedling and pathetic d e d a m a t i ~ ~ .  !lh 
btwm the proletariat apd the pasaantrJr ia * 
~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ r e l a t i - a ~ l p l l a ~  
dm-& mpIete i d q e d m m  of tb p d e k d  h 
. 4  
L ' 
Ation t o  d2 olther clasra. The d y  mast k& &m 
:;! - Thin can be schked, on the one had, b 
.' - ~~~~t &ktentionto all* p m p 8 8 i V e d  
I L: . W n i d l y  d t i o n e d  reqai-ts, on the &er bmd, 
~ d w i t h a r ~ d i e t n u t ~ ~ d y  
md 0&hg tireleaely a d  rddbsly  *t ih 
axlti-profetariam tendency and custom 
The import aad the limita of r manmver mnst dww 
be dearly coddered and aatliPed A mz~asubn must .h 
d e d  a coneemion, and a -treat a retreat. ft b not ao 
dmgtmm to exaggerah the uigm&mie uf mm?a tmn 
,, r n c e a l k  BB to n d r d m a t e  tberrr. The Vigibme aI 
the &sa mmt be supported and the &tmd of d m  apn 6-party or- and not lulled. 
~ e ~ p e l ~ m a ~ r p ~ i D ~ ~  
icsl d o n  of the working class in general, is the prrrty. 
h wrky b not 8 t rahb Ie  -POLL in she h.rmd 
of the %as&" of the mammvar, but a c m a b m  d 
rponkaeow weapon, the hig?~& -ion of p&rh 
spontaneity se- o whole. Became of tEtat, wery 
throughout its course mu& 4x1 & by k h ~  party i+dL 
I t ~ n o t e f ~ u r e e n m a t b e r h e r e o f ~ t i e , ~  
or maspimtive secrets, that is, not d tbe taebdqw of tSue 
shgg le  d klx proletarian atate w th pdetstias party 
orader ~ p W t  eosdi t im.  It irr a matter here of fbe 
political content of the mmauver. That h whv &e 
whhapmd explanatima, seeoxding to which the eo- of 
mi! a b d  and crimiimal, The kulak cot be k e k d  - 
H e  not judge by words, but by deeds, by taxen, g m k a  
' 
a d  leet pro&. However, onPs own parby, the wor- I I 
aad khe fillage p r  can k very w d  ckeivad Nothing b 
80 udcalakl to dieintegrate the revolutionary spirit of 
the party as mpridpled mamveriryy d i-oliPg 
Midi tabac lr .  
The moat important, beat & a W  a d  mwt - 
d t a r d d e  rrlle of every nunmamr m p :  W s  an p d y  
w k b a  1 d  neper bc diluted, united er U 
w i t h  &, no matter how "frkmdlf' the latter mag atill 
Btbdag, s u d * * ~ d ~ b e p e d ~ e m *  
lea&, M y  er indirectly, openty or maskdy, b the 
a l r s s r d h t i o p  of the parky k other p&, or to om& 
o# obhw elamen 4 therewith b i t e  the freedom ef 
m t ' e  a m  agitatim, er a step through which one is 4 
 lea- even if only in part, for the political line ef 
&her pa&. You ahalZ not raijt up the hmmm, not te 
u p k  of heling -re mother 
~ ~ i t h e w o r ~ t a n d m ~ t ~ ~ i f s ~ ~  I 
arises uut of the impatient dppurttlnistic endeavor to out- 
drip dwdwdopment ef d n  own p d y  a d  to jump over 
the newwary a- ef its maturity. It t right here that 
rn m h p  mast be jumped over. To jump over nemssarg 
& p a  with &e aid of s m y  e ~ p e d c i d ,  h, dipl~ l~~Ui6  
combktorial and deceitful gathering t o m  a d  MieB 
of contentiow organhatiom and e lemenhneh experi- 
mmh are always dangerow. Bat for young and d 
partien they are positively fatal. 
In a mmmuver, just am in a battle, it is not s t r a k g i d  
Riedom alone thst decidea (8tiu less the eombjnatorial wn- 
Ping), but the d m  relatiom of fama. Even r w m t l v  
a~lltrived mmmver ie in md dl the more -err 
for a mhtiouary party the yoange~ 4 weakex it b m 
d o n  be ib  h w ,  &em a d  mmhoatederaks. That 
is why we arrive here at an n t i d  point for the Comb- - The BobBevik party by no m- began with man- - 
awering as a M i v e n d  methad, bat it w e  to it, it grew 
i m b  h in *he measare that k eatabliehed &s within tba q 
working &as, h a m e  strong politieauy and matured idem- 
WY- 
Thst is jast whem the misf ortune lim, &a4 the epigonsr 
d -he+ drahgy -1 mamuwering abaty and h 
i b i l i t f ~ ~ f o ~ c o m m ~ t p a r t i e e a o t h e  
of thk i t r a w ,  thereby tearing them dm= ' 
B i l t o M  foundation and training them to unprid#d 
d a t i o a e  which, Imfortunakdy, only too often 
tm133prkhgtiara F i ~ y w a s n o t n o r b ~ i t b u g d * ~  
tlie main qmahiy of Bolshevinm, bat rather grad$# 
I t  m a  p d e l y  of this q d y ,  for whioh ib u t d m  d 
opponmb repro& it, that Bohheviam m u  &ayr jtwtly 
proud. Not a eoulful nooptimimu'', but intuIermae, Pigi- 
Ianee, rewlutiwary distmt, and the ~traggIe for every 
U ' a  breadth of independem-he are h b d a  
'es of Bolehevim The Communist pa& of the . tF= at a d  the East must also begin w i t h  their oultivation. 
The right to e w y  through great mnnaauvem mwt b b  ?H 
gainea in battle by preparing the political and material 
psibility to awry them through, h t  is, the ~trength, -,. 
3rmneaa and pergeverante of one's own organization, 
The Menshevik mmmavera with the Kao W n  T ~ Q  md 
- A 
the W r a l  C o m a  are therefore tenfold a i m i d  beoawe 
they weighed down uwn the frail ubwl,ders of the Corn- 
m d t  Pa& of C& and Endad T h e  -- 
~,not O* s e t a d  8 d d d  U r n  the d l l k h n  and h 
wq~king claw, but ale0 ended, weakened and undermind 
tbia weapon for the young Communht pa& in the ftrture 
struggle for a long time. At e rluxle time they dm in- 
duced elements of *poliiical L&orahaion into the rmka 
of the odeart party of the Combtern, the C3.S.U. 
The strategical chapter of the draft remaine as OW- 
aatelg dent &boat that hobby-horn of lab # 
yeam, aa if ita mouth were with water. Goodhearted 
e a r n  would say: Even that is god. Only, that would 
be r great mist&+ The miafortane lia in the fact that the 
draft p g r a m  itself, rm we have BLready aholRn in a e&eu 
of rxnmplen and d stiU show, n180 beam the ahmadm - 
of a rnamer  and that in the Id, that 51, combipatory 
sense. The draft makes mammer~with its own party. A 
portion of its weak spots it maah with the formula 
Uacc~dbg to Lenin," other8 it evades by rilence. Thaf 
b haw matbra also e t d  with the questian of mammverino 
&ategym It i8 impoeeible to epeak om t h w  queptiona 
witbout adducing the f w h  eqeripmw in China and 
En&d The very mention of rnamwera would have to 
conjure up the 4prm of Chiang'Kai-Shek lrnd P m d ,  
h t  the euthora do not want that. They prefer to be 
I 
. .* . 
n: - . .* 
W O P f O  L I V O S U T I O H  
&I onthefrrvorite&am sad tolcrntheIsademhipd 'k 
the -tern a fm hand And thabb p d e l g  wbat mu& ' 
P not be pmittQa The O o m b h t i o h t s  d th& caddata 
program should strve. Wmwk it muld b s- 
A p b  mmt aholutely h f d  in tbe etrabghl 
bpter  for the prhipkd & which dete*mine and l i d  
m8lm+ ars m & d r y  mdlud of tlre reddomv 
etruggle a-t the ahwi ~y which aan only be a W 
d d a a s t r a g g l e .  T h r P I e e n o t e d e b o v e , w b i h M a r s  
and hnb taught, can nndouWy be p- epen mom 
m y  4 precisely. Bat thay dus t  by aa meam fw 
brought into tha pm$ram of the Gpinhm. 
r 
10. T h e  S t r a t e g y  o # ( ~ i o i l  W a r  
Tn conuectim wikh the question of the armed np&ing, 
the draft p q m m  sayo quite cseudly: 
V h i a  drug& is mbject to the rnlerr of the axt' af 
airs. It pmnppoees a plan war, an && cbm&r . 
, of the fighting actiom bnd &td 8e 4
on the part of tbe prol&r$t." 
Here the draft do- not go beyond a terse reptition 
of the a n d  remarks once made by M a n  In &e m v -  
we have had, on one W, the eqeziencm of the 
' 
O c h k  revolution, and on the dm, those of tbe Bungap C 
. hn and Bavarian mo2utimw, of the atmggie in Itdy in 
1980, the upriehg in Bdgsrh in e b e r  1998, th6 
P' 
&antan movement of l-, mthonia in 1924, the lhgbh 
- gemd 8- of 1926, the up* of ths V i ~ e  p& 
briat in 19% and the 6-nd Chinesa rev01ution of X!&&W. 
A program of the Cornintern would have to c o d  a fa 
mom lacid and eonerebe chanrcterhation of the aocid and 
plitircal prereqai$b of the armed up* a well aa of 
the military and nkshgid preliminary d m  slrd 
, * th&t can grtmantee &e victory. hl nothing 
e x p e a  the s r t p e d d  a d  literary &a& of thb  docs- 
aDRntmmu&asthefa&thatthechrrptw~dtorwit. . ; * 
, h t h ~ t y  r t m ~ . ~ p k h d f ~ & C o m 4 k m c a d ~  
4 a S Q c u h ( J - G ~ ~ a a d g a 8 a , ~ ~  
~ k b u t , g i v u n e i t h e r a g e n e n l o h ~  . . d, 1 
atpaWaf i k e p M ~ t ~ i n ~ q m h m r  to 
~ ~ o f + h e d o d e o f * ~ f o r p o r r * r m b  
~ o f ~ ~ c a l m a ~  ; 
h 1924, after ttbe tragic -081 in Qemmy, we 
nlaauutqwtion.ner,dy,th.Lthp . a nd 1 
M o n & o r d e r o f  t b e d a y d ~ i k ~ t t h e ~  I d t l b a t i c r o f ~ r r p ~ , o f c i 6 l ~ . s d o f w a r m  - 
9 C  d be admitted h l d y  tbpt tBe of &a 3 
@ O d ~ f & @ a r m e d ~ p ~ ~ d y h * l t h ~  
of Ehua paper, 4 t h  regard to the rew1tionar7 c- 
n m  of many Earopean Communists who have not krated 
tbemaelvea to  thin day from their Bemporihg, fatalirrtic 
attitude towarde the fundamental ta~b of tha revolution. 
'&iB attitude f d  qJm8iwl mma dM& 4 mort 
~ t d y  in Rona Luxemburg. Pnyddqkdy  thh ia 
peRFeetly C O H P ~ .  rn p m  up laaaislr ia atm& 
* g . i e s t t h e ~ o r n t i c r p p a m b e f t b ~ ~ F # y  
n t r d t h e t d a n i c R u ,  ~ ~ ~ v t i l m t  
thh apparatas dbp1ace.a the idtidiw .ef & mmm a d  h 
w the d y  way oat ssd uah&hn ia r oponhmmo 
r P s w e m e a t t h s t w m t o o ~ d ~ ~ t i c  
~ ~ d b e r r i e r o .  h d a t i o n q p e d d r i h  
W i m n v l k m d t h e ~ o i b o a r c w o i r a d d ~ ~ h r  
hzemburg a mpmp for ths p d e k d m  redmt im ,  
Q h y t a ~ d r i k e , b e i t m w ~ o d i r ~ b y ~  
~ d O B l n o t y B t ~ t b s q ~ ~ a f ~ , ~  
dyrr ior i t .  Z b r k h e ~ l o f ~ i t i r ~ t o  
~ t h e ~ ~ ~ t b e b a r i a d * ~  
*trilre. T o b e r ~ t h e a h o l e d e v ~ o f a a r P l a z t m -  
b a t g ~ i n ~ ~ O P d * B a m n t o f f ~ ~  
~ ~ ~ r s i d b e r l a s t w m d , y ~ , l i o t 4 m m L & e l u t  
W- E J P ~ u p t O t b e w r y l a k t ~ n r y d m q  
h a d m  m o M ~  f&km b p m d d  
* ~ ~ p K t y : T b % m d & k i u ~ a b a  
~ d h ~ t h s & # h d I b r i a g * i k t B e  
d ? @ q r ~ P - * ~ * ~ e v ~  
& i r m s r p ~ i n t h i s p r r i e d r l i d w r i t h ~  
. " B o ~ ~ ~ o f t h e d a B s q ~ a r a n s t g ~  
lllEkcdiibolPQtlfdmeatlbOJBerbrtledoutof fa- 
~ ~ d . B o t o m b o d t h o b a s i e  -1-hk.
t b a t m , t o t b e ~ u s o r ~ n o f  i m a r m e d m  
h e * t o k * ~ r o & o f ~ t h e M d & ~ y . ~  
CB-th* of TrObh7 at thewsirtnef t h e w  
~ t h ~ ~ ~ ~ a n ~ ~ a Q , l ~ p U ~  - aL m.1 
. c B r e h i a ~ ~ a n a * ~ L a b r t o t b c  
I h & - ~ f  l S r l , W ~ ~ ~ & v t r a g g l e  
! theb-n -t w k h  a h d y  hm rid up& - ia O a  -** M h t r ,  rpe h a d y  omlrpv owdvea at 
dl wit31 th hlgarim uprising of k t  Sqkmber and dnal- 
qetieates mf &a Wober in the arehiveo . . . TIBE q r i -  
v of btie Qddm, the only v i e k k m  proleh&m re*o- 
~ a u p t m m w ~ m u & b e a ~ d i n d e t d  A h -  
& h a t i d  cel%ndar of & W&r mu& be compile& It 
m ~ e C  be damm, wtwe by wave, how evmta devebped d how 
effecW the parby, the m, the C e n t d  Committee 
wd %he military organhatimu. Wh& did the v a c ~ ~  
h k h  the party mean?. What qmi& weight did t h y  haw 
ia Lge -em1 k g  of ewwtrir What was the isle of the 
military orgrtniz&tiolls? That would h a work of ipesti- 
-b h m p ~ o e .  To W&p it eta hrrther mdd be a 
pmi%e h" Cmd.) 
'@h.what &ea the essential tank c o d &  of? !F4 tmk 
d k  of cpe8thg a anivereal referenee work OT m-@lroe 
&&en, a e o k ,  'regulations' on the @on d tihe e i d  
r r a r , d k f t m a b Q v e d ~ o t t h e a d ~  
~rs the high poiat of the revolution. A balance mud ba 
dram frotn the eqwriaca, the p d h h w y  ecditium 
thmonghly analyzed, the mistaka ~XBGI& the & 
E O ~  ~pexationg p a  oat d the n v  -** 
. A Will we tbemby enrich henee,  &at k th 
d the 1- eE B i s b M  *doped ,  OP 6 m* 
! W t y  of m o p ,  precepk d Tbc w rr 
d l ~ ~ t 8 e o t h o r , P ~ e ,  F o r o n s - a i m L a M p p &  
-3 
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t&l  # T B A T r W Y  ol Taw 
o f t h a ~ ~ a r t d w * r .  
@e~hd ~uperetrocbm Above dl, a chark&rht.ima af 
% l a e ~ ~ u m n p t i ( w ~ d o r t h e ~ e f p o w w b y t h e  
polehriat mmt be p d  Here we dl remain on t he  
&id of rewlutiosmry polities* For the UphIng ie aIso . . 
J by 8- &. % d* 0f ths 
~ t h e u m d n p r h i q r m u t b e . d . p t e d t o t b  
varyiag types of eountriee. There are mmtr iea wi& a 
p d e k h  majority of the papulntion and a h  camtrim 
witb an insipitbmt minority af the pruletarkt d kith 
an abeolub pdomkmw of tha paamtry, Betmem t h e  
two e r t m  polen lie the eomth of the t p d t i o n a l  tgpa 
ib a h h  for the epr&+h,  therefore, at i d  three 
Q p U  of o m n t r k  mast be -: thB i d m u  eo*, 
the egragm cormtry rrnd the h b m d i a t e  &ages, The 
Mduction [on the p& uad the d t h  for &a 
mmluEion] must eon* th charackrhtim of 
~omeofthetypmofcoaatr iee iraaxrthepoir t tof  
wdthauvilmu. Wemddertheupr i imgfromh 
Ontheone,ruadet ' . 1 ~ o f t h e o b j ~ a  
bm of the utruggIe aad an the o t k ,  from the 
m b j d  or active e h d p h t :  howebsold the uprit& 
b b p ~ d s n d ~ ~ t h r o u g h h a r d % r ~ t o g t r a r a n t e s  
ita vict~ry." ( E b d . )  
In lsB4, a collectim walfk on the elaboration of regtr- 
latiom of civil war, that im, r Afada t  irrtrodudion to the 
qraeskhna of the open conflict of the c h m  a d  the armed 
for the diutstormhip, wan by the Iarge air& 
f prswrr grouped a d  khe Military S&me Society. 
But thB work acounkered the of the Comintcm 
4 reuiatnnce has been h W  into the general aplldem 
&f the stmggle against ao-& Trot&- wea 
law Hquidated altogether. A mom l ighkded and mimi- 
nal &p hardly IM imagined. In an epoch of ahrr~pf 
c*, mgdationa of +he e n i l  war in tho m e  p m e a  
a b o v e d b ~ e f o b 4 ~ o f t b e i r a n ~ ~ t y o f ~  
o n e h ~ e ~ u ~ r y ~ n a t k ~ ~ o f t h e I e a d e r a  
d & ~ y . T h m e ~ t i a m n a o a l d h l r v e t o , b ~  
cmdmtly and enp#menM by the fmh ~f 
one'a own country. M y  rsueh r stdy can p-t a c e b h  
guarantee sgainst panicky etepri of capitulation just at tht 
moinent when boLdllB11a and firm determination are 
as d an a g h t  adveaturiet leap in a period whbh 
requires caution and patience. 
Had such mguhtiom been m d e  part of those 
~ J B  seriow ehdy of which mdd be an much the &by bb 
m y  Eommutiut as acquaintance with baaic i d e ~  of MWS 
d Leuin, we might probably have avoided the defea.tr d 
recent years, which were eaey to amid, wp&&y the qrbr  
ing in Canton mntrid witb such &Msh -. 
.4 
1111 On tbis question the h f t  program epeaks a h o a t  aa chPaily 
aritdoearofQendhiaminhdh. Of course a 
carmot k c m e  engrmsed in details. But it I I I d  p d  a 
problem in all its magnitude, and bring forth it9 main 4- 
foxmuh with a reference to i t 8  most important aehiemwnb 
and its most imporEsnt mietakee. 
Quite independently of this, the Sixth Congress, ia otrr 
o@on, mud o-h the E,C.CL I. in deoieion b 
slaborate "regulations" of the civil war an a guide p d  - 
ing from the balance of the past of vichw d 
defeat. 
11. T h e  Q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  P a r t 3  R i g i m e  . 
The o d a t i o n  quatiom of Bolahdm am . 
ably bound np with qumtiona of prognun and t a c h .  
this theme, the draft program mwtiona quite inciden*~' 
the -sit7 of %e str idest  molutio118ry o r e *  
of democratic centxabm. That i the only, and at *Q 
quite new formula that is to  cherackh the aartv d&t$~ 
We have b 0 w - n  quite wfl that the 
upon the foundation of democratic 
it wan assumed in theory and alao d e d  o 
that democratic m n t r a h  included s full 
dilrcwrion, the right of c r i t i b  and the 





J u h . t b r l u a d d p o f t h s e l s c ~ d r r m o n b L ~  
,- umb*-&--*- 
B & & ~ d ~ ~ ~ n ~ b t h e ~ ~ , t h P n U d d h  
~ a w r d y ~ c o m ~ & c i ~ ~ g r m r a ~  
tad the Qghthg ability of the party. Now, h w m q  to thb 1 
fopda, Jdch haa etaQd &e h t  in tbe whole part, an 
-1 Ateria h h &wed, *k of " t b  #frictsrt ! 
~ & t k w .  P kkrefam apperrn that I .- 
. simple hocrat i c  centdkrn no bmpr r- for the pa* r 
d ~ t i t n w r e q ~ a ~ ~ ~ ~ d  
cmtrak.  Thb fad quik simply @a khm P 
f l l ~ l ~  idea of Urewlationery mrgmbti~r),~ h 
~ e ~ m d ~ ~ ~ ~ t h e g a r t y .  
Wbst i t h e m a i a f e a b e o f t b e ~ 0 p ~ s ~ ) l r r t ~  
oqamhtion, d a %ry ~krict" am at thah which ewm 
&a& akw the idea of -tie a m t r d b f  Tb plain 
festare ia a party apparatab w h h ,  emmpWy independeat 
ofthepwtyoraaphiqtoruchanh&pdem+in'eu~ 
to through its autocratic bweaucraoy 
withat the party -w, and d e n  'Cord& & ik, --. 
b 1 8 e & b ~ . ~ ~ b d ~ ~ d n O f h ~ f ~  
by riolating etatub, ~~ p r t y  corndo# or 
n d m g  the ktter a mere hth~ 
The appsmtm hnm hankered for a 1- time for a s h  
a f o d  M 'Grevd~tionary orpnhtim~'  that nm is aet 
t a h  democracy cad mkralism. kr the last two para 
wa have h a d  a w b k  s&a of -tiom of 
p & y d e m o c ~ y b y t h e ~ b l e ~ t h d *  
w y  hademhip the seme of which amounted to the faat 
that demmxacy and cemtmhm d y  mean eabod.uakim 
Bo OF. Of eonme, mch an H ~ g a n b t b n n  masf, 
autwardy bE maloped with fad und diqphm d 
-my, while & latter in driven out by cirmrlara from 
&be, d dfcriticiam in +ted d r  the threat of 
&tide m.* The a-pt is mi&fo h o w  that & viola- 
* u t l o l e b W M P c l n a l Q o d b d d h #  - 
B m t o b - w -  I t -  
C 
this qmukioa to the &ld of fadom and mupineg, mi- 
hmpnwy -*I# * -rJ w s  d * 
pa*uum#Mn&abb. PJobdy hu pet dbcmwd w . '  
0 h m f ~ h t .  Ths8-mrdeUPbnOrrb 
~ ~ i ' l r p t h 8 ~ n r a s p h o ~ ~  
= ' W  
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1 
y d m  in the p m c a  of m y  Ef%but- 
sppeer JW groqxhp. The party mama 
adly danger of the moment and 
in it by adopt& the harsh and the, 
utiom on the prohibition of faetiom 
party knew very d then that 
by the Central Committee under 
'&e ledemhip of Lenin in auch s way that it would be 
, a ther  rude nor digloyal a d  still 1-8 l e d  to the abme of 
polRer (nee the 'CTestament" of Lain). The party %new 
b b t ,  aactly a year later, or if a third of the party would 
bequest it, even a month later, it could the @- 
'- at a new party congre~s, a d  add tbe mxeesery tp& 
ficntiom. The decision of the Tenth Party C o q  was 
a very sharp measure, evoked by the critical position of the 
d i n g  party at its most dangerous turn from War Com- :. ' b m-m to tbe N.E.P. harp -.urn p r o d  to b. 
M y  jrrst%d, for it only s u p p l ~ t e d  a correct and far  
righted policy and cut the ground from under the gmtt@qp 
thrrt hsd arieen In the tramition to the New E c w d c  
Policy. 
I However, the decision of the Tenth Party Con- 
on factions and gmpinp, which men then required an 
appropriate interpretation and application, is by no means 
an absolute principle that a t a d  above all other r q u h  
menta of the party, idpendent of the wuntry, the situation 
the timt. In so far aa the party lerrdemhip after the 
- departure of =-in order to protect itnelf from all 
critid~rn+uppo&d its& fondly upon the dechba  d 
the Tenth Party Congnss on fattiom and grolrpinss, it 
4Md party democraay ever morq md at the rams t h e  
acmmpbhed lam and lens its r e d  purpose, the elhimtion 
of the f~ctionaliata. For the b k  doa not conuimt of 
prohibiting fackioas, but of not pedtting any fac tha  to 
arise. Meanwhile, never have faotionu BO devsntated the 
party, by &inkegrating ib unity, aa rhce the departure of 
L&I from the leaderahip. At the name time, horrtvcr, 
t b e r e h ~ ~ p m d k d b t b p m t y m c h a h d d  
WO.SLO SXPOSWTIBH. .-%I 
.-, but f a d ,  df ru *.- *dy 
r o ~ C h r o a g h m d ~ U g h d * * e a ~ ~ . q f L  
m a m l v w a b  
--. 'yet, tl* nen Ldmj thi. d d  a p p m a ~  fa&@ 
&dm itra fmm the control of the party m r s w r , < ' a  
became ever more diluted by dl poemile rortr of 
the deeper sod more 8harpIy b the p r ~ ~ #  of 
Man proceed, not only M o w  bat &a w M h  fhe " 
= h a  &elf. Under the co+ete 
of the apparatae over the psrtg, 
the time of the ThWenkh Party C m g m s ,  the 
of upidgn witbin the apparattm &df Sind no m y  oat, fmt 
to appaaf to the party fop a: red deoion would mmn 9 
abject the appamtum to it s g a k  that 
-ping ir &d in advance thst it hm 
majority k d y  tO decida &e dhputd, qatstieru, by g 
metboda of appw#w &mvaqa that iu, qt~ll- 
f h a ~ ~ f t h e ~ r c t t a c t i o n .  T h e d i n t h r r t M  
the rrillng appamh fa&n, its own antngomistia fa&&@ 
arise ,&t do not at& ro mu& t o  aptllfa fhs aajd@ 
w i t h i n t b e w h ~ h f a e t i o n ~ t h e ~ d a t o g e t h m p p k ~  
the iaetitutiona of the a h k  apprah .  So h k  as &g 
aa the msjority at the party CongPws 
h d y  qaite atttomatidy as- for 
b ~ k d w h e n w m i t h m o Q t s o ~ a n d  
- . =*< 
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rrti b t r a f ~ k b  ow lpsr 
~ n o t m t d y t o t k p a r t y b t l t ~ t o ~ d i & m k h i p d  
; the prQl&riat. 
After the tirst % n t i - m 9  a m @ a b  in 1 M  
~ o a r r i e d ~ w i b h . f ] # a i d o f t b i s a ~ r a t ~ e f a O t i ~ n ,  
o d e p s ~ t o o k ~ d t h i n t h e ~ f d ~ ~  
#a d e g i r r m  of emm. The maam for tbis wan the 
h s  dia~hthfactin of the Tpainared proletarian vangaard 
the incipient do- in qumtip~ of ia- M 
dl ar foreign policy, The dvaneed Lmingxd oporkerm 
c m t h d  in 3928 the w d  bgm by tbe -ced workera 
o r F ~ i b I ~ , O n l y , ~ d e e p h ~ f d  
no open outlet in the psrty. They f o d  expmaion in the 
h d l w  -le withia & ~pparatw faeth.  
In April 1923, the CentM Committee d mi& a 
chcdar ta the wble party which waa sapposed to dmy the 
mtmolr 8 p d  bJ the %bketmM ( I )  ts*t 
d i & r e n e e o f ~ o n & e ~ r y p & d w i t h i n t h e  
k d  of the '%dnisbn, that b, wi@in the f a c t i d  c9Ib 
@ of WW?tL M W88 Only #- && && broad 
p r t y  wdm hmed that saeh .diffemms d orainion 
&ted at all, which did not, by pmmt this higb 
e r n e  fmm demi- &a m y  membe&ip with the 
dh t  it is the m t i o n n  which b d h q t h q  
the W t y "  of the %t Ghad", Thia propagnmb 
m d d  its full& bloom h * -Party Gn- 
kook the party m w m  by rlupP3ee by &tse a-rpbud 
and wmpli~ttd, but wrdiclg h &eii &a orjgin, 
~ p f o a n d ~ o f ~ ~ w e e a t 8 t t r w  
mdomoftheral ingfackh & t h e ~ ~ m m e h t  
More the w y  a m ,  W, W Mwww a d  k h  
h b g m 3  orgadti-,  tb t  b, the twe f o d k  of 
ahe w g ,  adqhd rtdutiam nt & & & a h k t  mmf- 
of a  6 h & ~ * .  It 3 4df-&- &kt 
h t h  m &phi mah4rwly. Tbia *& af "molu- 
tiomry oqpnkntioi'' m a  d e & d  by Moocow to be a I 
~ S t i O n o f t h e ~ a p p a r a t m d L t g i a g r s d n i e e d  
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ M ~ .  dr**whad  
~ ~ . d o f ~ ~ ~ ~ *  
~ d ~ a d o r g d d h n .  H e r a r s d u  ' * ]party ~ w 8 t U S  dm18 by With 
ib handred p a r c ~ t  umknity thst in all the pridple 
I .  
que~t im of pruty life there i no party. 
I.-- The F o m E b  Party C-s WM now compelled b 
eettle new M e -  of opinion on variow basic qwtiom 
and to determine a new compoeition of the leaderahip buW 
t b  back of tk4 w-ted putts(. The C o q p a a  imtwdi- 
etely left this decision to a moet scmpdody siftad 
hiefarchy of party arecretaries. 'Phe Fonhnth  &rty 
Co-6 w m ~  a further mieatone on the road to the liprri- 
dation of psrty democracy by the methods of thsk 
L, the arbitrary pwer of the masked apparatus faction, 
The next sta of the struggle taok place only a little I$ while ago. e trick of the rulmg faction d& 
alwap confronting the party with an already ad* 
decbion, tffith accomplished fwta thak could not be made 
4 algain. 
Thb new, higher state of %~~It~tioaaq 
tion", however, did not by any mmnn signify the lipaidation 
of factiow sad groups. Dn the contrary, th+r development 
became still stronger and sharper, within the party maam 
as well aa within the party apparatus. 80 fsr EM the 
party was concerned, the bareuacratic liqniMon of the 
U g m u w  benrme ever h r p r  here, a d  by- ved- 
aa far MI the infamy of a Wr@ &er and Article 5& 
d y  demomtrated its impotence. At the same t h e ,  a parr 
cesl of a rwm r$t within the Filling faction ib& took p h  
which ie even now dewdopins fd. Certabdy, eeen m w  
: &em is no Eeck of meadadiotls demosdmtiom & d 
mity md of circulare tbak are mapposed to v m  fbm 
complete una-ty of the leaden. N w e d h d e ~ ,  d indi- 
cations a r e  that *he d a h t i u a  8%-e within the dod 
appartns faction, h u e  of itu hpaeasmy, b re- 
rm ever sharper charsota and ia driving the party to - 
new explo8ioxL 
then, ia the theory and the pmctk d * 
~ - q  Ofg&xationn, wGch mwt surelp be m m w t d h *  
&oq and the pmtice of u a a r p c k  
T¶6n matter, however, i~ far from being limit& any 
h g e r  to the Soviet U h  In 1923, the campaign aga* 
the formation of factiom p d e d  mainly from the moti- 
vation that fadions can form the kernel of new parties and 
the dictatomhip of the proletariat in a country with a 
pdomhmtljr p e a a d  popuhtiioa can permit no freedom 
of pa&. 
In ibelf, this statement ia absolutely correct. Only 
it mq& a correct policy md a come& But it 
is clear that thia statement ahodd at the same time have 
u i&d  the abdonment of tbe ertensian of the Tenth 
PaFty C0ngFe.M ~esolution of the d i Q g  C2.S.U. to the 
C o r n m e t  partiea in the bourgeob rtatea. Bat the bureau- 
cratic d g h  hm itu o m  tortumm Logio. If it tolerates 
no democratic control within tbe Soviet party, tben it 
hkr&ta it d the h a  within the Cornintern. which  till 
mtadu formally above the C.P.S.U. That is why the seven 
lnsde a rudvernal recipe out of the rade and &loyal inter- 
pretation of the reeolutioa of the Tenth Parky Congm~ 
a d  exteded it over aIi the Communist organizations on 
the $10h. 
Bobheviem nlwaya distkgubhed itaelf by a hietoricd 
coa&tion in ebbiating organization form, but not 
bynalrdwhemn. %BoMdh-theirotaan- 
imtional struckure radically at evwy t r d o n  from one 
stage to m t h e x .  Now, on &e mntrary, one and the same 
p G p I e  9f "revo la t i~y  organh&b" is applied to the 
powerful party of the proletarhm dhtatclrrbip aa well M 
to the German 0 t Party, w h b  pmenC a d o a  
politicel factor, to  the youw Chhee party, which wae 
immediately drawn into the vortsx of revolutionary strug- 
gles, as well aa, flnnUy, t o  tbe party of the U.SA., which 
d y  constituteu but s s m d  propaganda eirela It L 
enough for m y  k i d  of do* b be q r a m e d  in the latter 
about the methodn k t  upon it by Pepper who is right 
in command, and there descends upon the "doubrs" all 
pe ib l e  meaaarea of repriad for the formation of factioas. 
A d  the yopag party, which ~II *till in the cmqdetely 
oatedfpeeaDmdprtyIife,freedomof d h w  
freedom d c o W ~ 4  nad d e r  alao of p u p  
stion of their pathe, &me padim wiR never .ie 
rwo1ution&ry pmw* 
young pmtia of the WE& h t  were j 
wan no appeal. The 
I 
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*.& th. prty  fram -am el- a d  
~ f x m a & r r l h w r a t i c & c i & r r h a ~ t s t h s i r  
p B ,  h m  f-, from -die p*eie%trs from 
W m ~ ~ ,  ete., them this w o ~ k  drdg 
hingc~througheiaoethe&rtdayof  theCamhteTn9r 
m h b  Ak the Fa& Congmr thh work, d h  xegsad 
to the B k w h  party, wen ~sunted ertwmely sharp fome 
of &rug& Still this d E u W a t i o n  waa imepambl~ 
with the iadividsd qwiencm of the mhual 
oectians of tke Comhkm 4 mew out of t h e  exwrhcm. 
Tbsir ~ ~ n a  were the iwstionm of national policy 
which k m e  international quee-. The Bdahvhtion 
of 1W eamphtely oasamed the ahalrwbr af o &at- 
Tharem01aerwasheldatthaten~phoftheleadisgorpam 
d the Cmmwmht partiee and they, wem muired to. rdopt 
irmndddy a hd position on the infernal diffemces of 
opioioa in the C.P.S.U., it clepending in advance upon this 
p n i k k a  whether they 4 & further in the 
tera The European Communlet prtim, hewwer, were by 
m e  m a m  quipped in If324 for a eudden d d m  d the 
R u d m  &cussion questions, in whi& jtrst at Lt that two 
primtipled tendencies were forward, growing out 
of the new atage of the proletarian dietsbrship. Of cwree 
&a cleadng work WM also newaarlp after 1924. Men 
elemate rere SlBO q& c o d y  mwd from many 
d a m ,  Nmerthelem, taken aa a whole, the "Bolshevi- 
mtionn comietd of this: with the wedge of the Busslan 
difxensces of opinion, driven from above with the hammer 
af the state upparatas, the hademhip being f o d  at 
the moment in the Communiet pmkiea of tbe Wmt wem 
amded  wer mu3 over ag& AU tbis sailed under the 
tkg af the ntrugsle q+Mt the fomatbn of &tiom. 
I£ a faetion c r g n ~ ' h d d e  the party of &a prok 
tadan vanguard which threatem to its Bgbthg 
ability for a long time, the prty  then t naturally con- - w i t h  tht d d h  whether ib &odd &dl allow time 
hr a wpphw&szy -tion ol. it d d e m  an 
i m d b t e  split an unavoidable, A w* m y  csa 

ba $miIar phenomam which arose in the period afkw 
Lenim, That mmy of tbe expelled made grievoun mktshsr 
i p  haanteatable and we pointed that out no later tban 
&em. That many of the expelled, after their wrpuhion 
from the Comhtern, bave turned bsck to s great extent, 
ia their points of departare, to the ]Left ~1ocia1 democracy 
or to r p d i s l i s m ,  b equally t r u ~  Only, the h e k  of M- 
e A i p  by no meam eonsistr of driving the young Zeader- 
ships of the national parties into s blind alley every time, 
and thereby aondemaing their -dud repmahthea 
ta ideological degeneration, The Qr~olntiomry o r e  
 tio on" of the bureaucratic I e h &  therefore atan& 4s  
a menacing obdcle in the path of the development of aI1 
the plrrtiee of the Communist fnternatlod. 
Organizational questiom are inseparable from qaea- 
tiom of program and tactics. A clear account mnst be 
d e r e d  on the fact that the most important source of 
opprttmim in the Comintern is constituted by the baresu-. 
matic apparatus dgime in the ComIntern itself as well au 
in its leading party. That bureaucratism in the S e t  
Union is at the same time ale0 the ezpwsion and the meam 
of pmeure of the non-proletarian dasmes upon the p b  
G a t ,  of that there cannot, after the experience# of the 
ymrs 1923-20, be any doubt. The draft of the program of 
the Cointern gives a q& correct formulation in thin 
w e  when it rays that bureaucratic degeneration " a h  
Wtably an the ba$s of an bdficiatly cdtuxed mars 
and clsras auatces  alien to the proletariat". Here we 
have the key to the anderstmdhg not only of bureau- 
c r a w  in genera but &o of its cstxaodhry growth 
in the ht five years. If the inaddent cultural level of 
the maaw row cumtantly in thh period, which b not to 
be doubted, then the bask for the growth of bureaucretism 
can be aought only in the grmth of clam iduema alien 
to the proletariat. To* the & p e  m which the European 
m p r t i m , a b w e  Snt*dhcGqbuh,adaptsa 
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h 
elemeutn, oa the b h  of ffi 
altered, dieto* a d  
the d d x h t r a t i v e  and 
d w a p  adopted the &bed &chi- dth VZ 
, and aigned any resolution at d& o h  *W 
b e  over those party who a e ~ e  
T R E  Y T . A T I B T  0 1  *Ha 
zdWaa ef the Forurteeatb Party -a of the C2.S.W. 
aa the -uty of n more demoeratie d mart wlldim 
WraBip i tbe.Chmiab h a  beem transformed in pme 
t i es in to i tsopp i ta  T h e ~ d ~ ~ i t h e  
Camintern is beaming a life question for the intermtionel 
mdutionary movmuent. This chanep can l~ rcbieved in 
t m w a p : e i ~ h a P d i n h a d w i t h t h e c h a q e d t b e  
dgim in tb cP.a.U. ox or the tberqgh +t khe 
d e  of the C.F.&U. in &a Comintera Every 
~ m ~ b e & t Q M u ~ f h e ~ s a y .  TbPsb* 
. f ~ h c b a o ~ p o f ~ i n b ~ P . ~ , ~ . i ~ a t t h e r a m e t i m e  
r -k h r  mgenerating tht +me in the Corninterm 
I a p d b r t h e ~ a f t b e ~ ~ ~ o f  our 
That is why the very mtwt be d e d d y  
m a d  fmm the p q p m  that. M q ,  d v e  be 
put d r  the control of the "revo1utiomry o r g r r ~ t i ~ ~ ' '  
of am W v & k  g o w ~ ~  bureaucracy. The 
WF iW m& b* given bat% its xi&ts. It i memsoarg 
for the party to Beeome a party again. That mwt duo 
be d d  in the program in such womb that no pp6db%ty 
of existen- is left to bureauclcatirrm md umqmtory 
h&a& by tricka of interpretatinn and theoretical 
sobterfuge 
I $ , T h e  R e a s o n a  f . o r  t h e  D e f e a t  of t h e  
q p p o a i t i o n  a n d  I t6  P e r r p e c t i v e  
The Loft, pmlebrian wing of the party, which & 
down ita views in a cieriee of documents, the prbdpaI of 
d k h  i* aha P b W m  ef #b B*-D& (0- 
ripiorr), been subjected, be- with tke f d  of 1- 
t4l a syBtemntic, mg#u&mw maquLip of -k 
The methods of this Iiqaidotion were de- by &e 
cha& of the party which became mare bareau- 
cra6ic to the degree that the of the mn-pmb 
b * c b m s ~ h ~ t - ~ I  The 
pwdbatierdmauwM O p m e h ~ w a m ~ l o g  
f b e ~ p o z i ~ ~ c t B T O b t l a e p e r i e d i n ~ ~ t k  
proletariat had to a d e r  the greateet d&, the miid 
. h w a o y  cam to life again, and in the C m m m & t , e  
the Centrirt~pportumiot tendencka could b e  4-i 
Tk dnrt deloditiw ef khe Opposition fobwed b d i & l y  
&tar the &f-t of tbe Gexman revolution, w a mrf (d 
~ ~ t t Q i t , n O t o ~ p e a 5 r .  Thbdemoli~nwoald~uaa 
b a o q p m  n n ~ ~ b l e  with c vietory mf the &mam 
proletariat, which would have k e d  extraordinarily tht 
&a conscia- of the proletaxiat of the U.S.&&, and 
therefore, dm, its power of resistance against the pmsare 
of the bo-@m claam, interndy au weli ma akmdlj, 
and @nst the intermediary of this pm-y bar 
e 8 ~ ~  
T o  h a y  the general epirit of the regmu- that 
took place in the Comintern towards the ead of 1- it 
mdd be highly important to foliow step by skip  how the 
k d q  group gained its %toria'' over the Oppdtim 
at tbt earioue rtagea of ib down-~liding. I am not in a 
Wtim to carry through this work within the limitr of a ... 
emham of tbe draft program. Nwerkhdeas, it M 
for m u  p r p a  to consider how the drut %ictoqm over 
tat '@ppitim in $ep&mber 1994 was &W a d  
e q W d  In his debut article on the q u h  of in& 
fienrd @icy, Stdin mid the following: 
Tk &hive &tory of the m1utimary h g  in 
the Commmbt partiear is the surest htdhtion # tlb 
k#haw proca~a thus a m  w w  tw #h 
mddql c b . "  
And in another place- in the same article he uap: 
Tf we a t i l l  add to t h  the fact of the complete 
isolation of the opporttlniat c u m t r  in the R.C.P., idte 
phhm in umplete. The Fifth C o r n m e  only c m d i h t d  
the vichry of the rev01utiwary wing in the principdl 
k of the Caminhmw ( ~ V D A ,  6- iH, I-, 
My -is. L.9.) 
The a-t of the  fops thmfere, ia e @ h d  . 
TEL I X B A T ~ ~ T  ow T X ~  
hm w the readt of the fact that the prolebrht irr goiqg 
the Lef#, im immediately approaching the rewlukion and 
k n  slresdy g h n  the rwolutionary wing the a~cedancy 
over the opportmiat in all the sections of the Cumintern. 
Now, aftex &ost five yeam have passed since the greatat 
defeat of the international proletariat in the fall of 19a8, 
PRAVDA flnda itself compeIl& to admit that '%he wave of 
a certain apathy and dejection &at ~ e t  in after the defeat 
of the German proletariat and permitted German capitsl 
to consolidate it8 poaition" (Puma, January 28, 1928.) 
iu onlp now kgimbg to disappear. 
But then there arises a question which is new for the 
present leadership of the Cornintern, it is true, but not for 
tla: S h o d  not therefore the defeat of the Opposition in 
1923 and the years that followed be explained not by a 
h f t ~ r d  awing, but by a Rightward rwhg  of the working 
d a r e ?  The answer to this quution decides everything. 
At the Fifth Congress in 1924 and later on in vari- 
ous articles and qeches, the clear and categorical answer 
to that was given: The strengthening of the revolutioniwy 
elements witbin the labor mwement of Europe, the new 
ding  wave, the appro~ching proletarian revolutio~that 
in what brought about the collapse of the Opposition. 
NOW, however, the turn of the political o w j d f l ~ e  
after 1928 towards the Right and not towarda the Left 
has become a well estabhhed, already generally r e c o p i d ,  
incontestable fact. That ie why the other fact, too, ia not 
to be disputed that the evolution of the struggle against 
the Opporition and the accentuation of this struggle up to 
expulsion and exile h most closcly conaected with the 
political proceaa of bourgeois stabilization in Europe. To 
be m, this process wan frequently interrupted in the last 
four years by important revolutionary events. m y ,  new 
miehkea of the leadership, more grievous than tho% of 1928 
in Germany, gave the victory into the hands of the enemy 
every time and thereby created new eourr:ea of sustenance 
for bow& a t s b h t i o a  The ktewaat id  rmabctiarcalay 
h a  &fed a d  t o g e t k  &A i b  dm 

O f t J m d I k i d ~  A t ~ t ~ p o i n t r ~  
somm change their ooncepkione than their cwhwry wordr. 
!l!btL a ~ d l r n r o f  tbekklogid-of  colom. 
W h i k ? t h e ~ w ~ r e v i o i n g ~ i a d m o s t d ~ ~ -  
tial poinb, it pasred it off aa a development of Xmbiarn 
d at the tiane ohareckrbd the real i n t s m t i d  w 
wlutionary matent of J ' ' ar ' M k y i d " '  It did 
thh not only in o&r to mask &elf both outwardly d ' 
ipwady, but .&o in order to adapt itself mom m a y  to 
k k . ~ o f i t r o r r n ~ .  
u n d e r n u  this wil l  not aubject me to the aheap reproach 
that I have c o d e d  tbe &ticism of the &aft program 
with m m.skiag of fie l c p d  of ~~. The p m  
merit draft program has originated e n W y  in an ideo- 
l ~ c d ~ d t b t w ~ ~ e d r r i t h t h i s ~  Theapthom
of the dxaft fed t h d e a  for &a -st park oa this legend, 
always p r o d  from it, and utilirned it aa the measuring 
rod of all things. The whole draft reflects U s  period 
Political hiotorg has bean enriched by a new, quite 
eaordinarily btructive chapter. It might l ~ !  charactef- 
id tm the t h p k  of the v r  of m y h k d n g ,  or more 
sinrpty, %eol+cal PI a plitid wea.pnW. Aa 
experience hss taught, thia weapon d sot k u d w  
estimated. The leap from the .realm of freedom is far 
from behind us. We live in a &a sodety which is un- 
W n b l e  without darknesm, pfeju&m aad  upe erst it ion. 
The mykh that corrwponds k d a i n  inhmts or tradi- 
t i 4   CUB^^ can always p m  rr great pwer  in a class 
society. But with a myth alone, eveo if it b ever no plan- 
fully organid d dirpmet~ of dl the mureen of state 
power, no p a t  policy csa b oarrid on. Least of all a 
hvaluthary policy, espcidy in our e p h  of brusque -- 
Myth-creating mwt untdngly become entaq$ed in 
b ma e o n t f d i l e t h .  A BLILII pad, ma if perhqr the 
most hprtanh of thwe contrdctiom, I have -9 
name8. Qnibe h h p u h t  of whether extwnal cudtiow 
~ p e r m i t r n e t o ~ y o u t t h e k ~ k b t o e e n d , I ~ y  
l . I  . 
T.BS- C F B I ~ I Q I  O P  t 
V 
lQOtiOPky* m w a x b a f  
&ha, the d d  of the Oppoeizion, which, 
the German proletariat towsrda the end 
retood how tO e w h  the rkam 
amwatione amd permutiom, for a m a  
w i l l  ring ever more loudly* 
road over which the idea of r e d  
triumph in the Cornintom aB wen - 
m in the whole inkmation4 proleteri& depende in r bigb 
degree the present leadership of the Cornintern and 
~ u e f l ~ ~ ,  k a y  upon the six& C O R ~ S .  
No matter how the &&ion of the latter may tum out 
- -we are pmpad for the worst i the estimation of the 
pment epoch and ite h e r  h d a d e e  and qwcidly the . 
~ t i o n o f ~ ~ 0 f t h e l a 8 t i i v e ~ e a m ~ t o  
#hd N o ~ ~ ~ ~ a w c u d h t m ~  
h n  d u  b#cmw~itt b d theg 
h ib pmpm ef th C ~ f u m  
I 

